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A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem
I. INTRODUCTION
Many observers believe that the executive labor market in the U.S. functions
poorly. 1 At many public companies, senior executives exert excessive influence over
the pay-setting process, and the outside directors who are charged with negotiating pay
arrangements on behalf of shareholders lack the tools and incentives to bargain
effectively. 2 Given the interconnectedness of the market, even well-governed firms
must augment pay in order to attract and retain talented executives.3 The result, under
this view, is systematic market failure with executives receiving more compensation
across the board than they would in a well-functioning market. 4
This Article accepts the premise of market failure and considers potential
regulatory responses. To the extent that commentators have focused on regulatory
responses to date, their proposals generally have been aimed at improving the paysetting process by, for example, increasing board independence or giving shareholders
greater influence over the process. 5 These are admirable goals, but this Article takes a
more direct tack. After all, despite improvements in board composition and processes
and in the transparency of executive pay disclosures, there has been no apparent
slackening in the growth of executive pay.
This Article focuses specifically on the issue of excessive pay levels that result
from deficiencies in the executive labor market.6 Excessive compensation is
objectionable on several grounds. First, and most obviously, it strikes many as unfair
that executives receive more compensation than they would in a well-functioning
1

Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (Norton
1991); Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON.
POL’Y 2, 283 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors,
65 J. FIN. 2363 (2009); Lucian Bebchuk & Robert Jackson, Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823
(2005); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents With and Without Principals, AM. ECON.
REV., May 2000, at 203 [hereinafter, Agents]; Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs
Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. ECON. 901 (2001) [hereinafter, CEOs].
2
Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 766-74; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X, at 300-02; Bebchuk,
Grinstein & Peyer, supra note X, at 2373-82; Bertrand & Mullainathan, Agents, supra note X, at 208.
3
Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 840-42; Bertrand & Mullainathan, CEOs, supra note X, at 916, 929.
4
Bebchuk et al., supra note X; Bertrand & Mullainathan, CEOs, supra note X.
5
Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003); Ran Duchin
et al., When Are Outside Directors Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 873 (1991); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998); Randall S.
Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access
to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331 (1996); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too (Harvard John M. Olin
Discussion
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
525,
2005),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Clark_525.pdf.
6
Other commentators have focused on the impact of executive labor market deficiencies on
compensation design. Bebchuk et al., supra note X , at 786-91 (arguing that executive compensation is
structured to camouflage pay and limit outrage); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note X, at 831.
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market, and it is likely that excessive executive pay has contributed in a significant
way to the growing inequality of wealth in this country. 7 Second, from an efficiency
perspective, one can think of excessive executive pay as an economic tax on
investment in the corporate sector that inefficiently distorts capital allocation. 8
Recognizing the existence of a problem and coming up with an effective solution
are two different matters, however. Most commentators have shied away from the
idea of capping executive pay, and for good reason: Regulators do not have sufficient
information to effectively cap executive pay without creating massive inefficiencies. 9
On the other hand, this Article argues that taxation might be a valuable tool for
mitigating the adverse effects of excessive executive pay.
This Article proposes and analyzes a two-pronged tax response to the problem of
excessive executive pay – the imposition of a surtax on executive pay in excess of a
threshold combined with investor tax relief. If we assume that a surtax would have no
impact on behavior, the imposition of a surtax would reduce the after-tax income of
executives, which would directly respond to the unfairness of excessive pay and the
effect of excessive pay on inequality of resources. Investor tax relief would tend to
reverse the inefficient distortion in capital allocation that results from excessive pay.
It would be a mistake, of course, to blindly assume that a surtax would have no
impact on behavior, but this Article argues that distortions created by a surtax are
likely to be minor. Evidence on the elasticity of executive labor supply and taxable
income suggests that a modest surtax on executive pay would have little impact on
hours worked or on taxable income. By these measures, an executive pay surtax
would be a relatively non-distorting and efficient tax. However, experience with other
tax penalties directed at executive pay – in particular the “golden parachute” tax –
suggests that a portion of the surtax might be passed on to investors through increases
in pre-tax compensation. Any shifting in incidence would undermine the objectives of
the surtax. There are reasons to think that executives’ ability to shift would be limited,
and shifting could be mitigated by raising surtax rates, but shifting is a concern with a
surtax proposal.
In addition, firms and executives might seek to restructure compensation to blunt
the impact of the surtax. It is even possible that some public companies might go
private or that private companies would be dissuaded from going public as a result of a
surtax that was limited to public company executives. However, this Article argues
that none of these concerns would be particularly serious or insurmountable.
Several forms of investor tax relief could effectively mitigate the inefficient
distortion of investment that follows from the extraction by executives of excessive
compensation. This Article considers both general and firm-specific relief targeted at

7

See supra note X and accompanying text.
See supra note X and accompanying text.
9
See supra note X and accompanying text.
8
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the corporate and investor level. Given uncertainty as to who bears the cost of
excessive executive pay and a variety of practical concerns, this Article argues that
corporate tax relief would be preferable.
Of course, investor tax relief need not necessarily be linked to the imposition of a
surtax on executive pay. Either regulatory response could be pursued independently.
However, this Article makes the case for a combined approach, principally because of
the risk that a portion of the surtax could be passed on to investors. “Refunding” the
surtax proceeds to investors would ensure that distortions in investment were
mitigated, and not exacerbated, by the imposition of a surtax.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II describes a
conception of the executive pay problem that motivates the regulatory responses that
follow and provides a basis for their evaluation. This Part clearly lays out the negative
consequences of excessive executive pay as well as the factors that purportedly result
in market failure. Part III considers the first prong of a tax response – a surtax on
executive pay – showing how a surtax would respond to the concerns associated with
excessive compensation and demonstrating that the distortions created by a surtax
would be minimal and manageable. Part IV takes up the investor tax relief prong of
the proposal and is concerned primarily with the tradeoffs involved in designing
investor relief.
Part V considers regulatory alternatives, with a particular focus on coercive
regulation, such as pay caps. A considerable advantage of coercive regulation over the
two-pronged tax response is that a pay cap is more difficult to avoid. However, the
potential downsides of one-size-fits-all coercive regulation are simply too great for this
approach to be seriously considered. The superiority of a combination of a surtax and
investor tax relief as a regulatory response to the executive pay problem is reiterated in
Part VI, which concludes the Article. In addition, this Part suggests that the arguments
made in favor of a surtax could also be used to bolster the case for a very different
regulatory reform that would not be addressed specifically at the executive pay
problem, that is, increasing tax rates at the high end of the income distribution
generally.

II.THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM

A. The Magnitude of U.S. Executive Pay and the Increase over Time
Executive compensation in the U.S. is high in both relative and absolute terms, is
economically significant, and has increased markedly during the last several decades.
According to a recent report, the median value of 2010 CEO compensation at the 350
largest U.S. public companies was $9.3 million, an increase of over 10% from the
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temporarily reduced pay levels seen during the financial crisis. 10 Public company
CEO pay has increased in real terms by 500% or more over the last 30 years. 11
The growth of executive pay can also be seen in the growing disparity between top
executive pay and the compensation of rank and file workers. 12 In 1980, the ratio of
average CEO pay to average rank and file worker pay was 42 to 1. By 1990, that ratio
had increased to 100 to 1. At the peak of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the ratio
exceeded 500 to 1. The ratio declined as executive pay moderated during the financial
crisis, but even in 2009 it continued to exceed 250 to 1. The compensation of other
senior executives has also risen dramatically over this period, much more substantially
than the pay of rank and file workers, although not as dramatically as CEO pay. 13
Executive pay is economically significant. U.S. public companies are required to
disclose in their annual proxy statements compensation data for their “top five”
executives, currently defined as the CEO, CFO, and three most highly compensated
executives other than the CEO and CFO. S&P’s Execucomp database collects this
data for executives at over 2000 public companies. 14 For 2008, aggregate executive
compensation for roughly 10,000 Execucomp executives totaled $25 billion, an
average of about $2.5 million per top executive. 15
Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein collected similar data for Execucomp listed
executives over the 1993 to 2003 period, and they also estimated pay for U.S. public
companies with market capitalization in excess of $50 million that were not listed on
Execucomp. 16 For the entire period, they estimated that top executive pay constituted
10

Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2011, at B1 (reporting data
compiled by the Hay Group). Average pay for this group of CEOs was $10.6 million. Hay Group, The
Wall Street Journal/Hay Group Survey of CEO Compensation, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2011,
http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/php/CEOPAY11.html. See also Pradnya Joshi, We Knew They Got Raises.
But This?, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at BU1 (reporting on data from Equilar indicating that median
2010 pay for CEOs of 200 large public companies was $10.8 million). CEO compensation is highly
correlated with firm size. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2485, 2493 (Orley Ashenfelter ed., Elsevier 1999). Thus, it is not surprising that median
pay for the largest 200 companies would be significantly greater than median pay for the 350 largest
companies.
11
Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49, 51
(2008) (finding a 500% increase); Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New
View from a Long-Run Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2107 (2010) (finding an
increase of over 500%).
12
The following pay ratio data was retrieved from the AFL-CIO website. Executive Pay Watch: Trends
in CEO Pay, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/pay/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
13
Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75, 77-80 (2010).
14
The Execucomp universe includes current and former members of the S&P 1500.
15
All the data reported herein are based on the Execucomp variable TDC1. TDC1 is a grant date
measure of executive pay and includes salary, bonus payments, long term incentive payouts, perks, and
the grant date value of stock options and restricted stock. Execucomp also includes a rough measure of
realized compensation, coded as TDC2. TDC2 replaces grant date option values with realized option
values. For this group of executives, aggregate compensation as measured by TDC2 for 2008 was
$28.4 billion.
16
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X.
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6.6% of the aggregate earnings of these companies. 17 More importantly, however,
they showed that this fraction was increasing over time. Between 1993 and 1995, top
executive pay absorbed only about 5% of earnings. Between 2001 and 2003, the
fraction of earnings devoted to top executive pay had increased to almost 10%. 18
Bebchuk and Grinstein estimated that top executive pay at non-Execucomp firms
with market capitalization in excess of $50 million was, in aggregate, about two-thirds
of executive pay reported in Execucomp. 19 Assuming that this relationship still holds,
a ballpark estimate for 2008 top executive pay for U.S. public companies with market
capitalization in excess of $50 million would be about $40 billion. 20 Note, moreover,
that these figures include only the top five executives at each company. There are
likely to be more than five “senior” executives at many large, public companies, and
thus this figure likely understates the aggregate amount of senior executive pay. Also,
bear in mind that these figures represent annual flows to company executives, not onetime transfers.
Obviously, public company executives would receive considerable compensation
in a well-functioning managerial labor market. Reciting the current levels of and
growth in executive pay does not establish the degree of excessive compensation or
even the fact of excessive compensation, but rather provides a base against which
one’s perception of excess may be gauged.
B. Explaining Excessive Executive Pay
This Article is predicated on an assumption of market failure in the public
company executive pay setting process. Its aim is to consider regulatory responses –
in particular, a tax response – given that assumption. This Article is not intended to
reopen the debate concerning the efficiency of this market, 21 but in order to evaluate
potential responses, it is necessary to understand in what ways the executive labor
market may be deficient. This section will briefly review the efficient (sometimes
called “optimal”) contracting view of the process and the managerial power view
described by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and myself. 22 Of course, one may
conclude that the executive labor market is less than fully efficient, but that the
managerial power view is not an adequate description. In such a case, some of the

17

Id. at 297.
Id.
19
Id.
20
$25 billion aggregate compensation for Execucomp executives plus 2/3 x $25 billion = $41.7 billion.
Bebchuk and Grinstein’s data are reported in 2002 dollars. The $50 million cutoff would be somewhat
higher in 2008 dollars.
21
For an overview of the debate, see Symposium, Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation, 69 CHI. L. REV. 729 (2002); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S.
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (reviewing LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION (2004).
22
Bebchuk et al., supra note X.
18
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analyses and prescriptions that follow might require modification. For the bulk of the
analysis, however, the critical assumption is market failure, not the descriptive
accuracy of a particular model of market failure.
The traditional conception of the executive pay setting process is the optimal
contracting view first set forth by Michael Jensen and William Meckling. 23 Under
their model, a board of directors that cannot perfectly observe the effort, focus, and
effectiveness of its agent (the CEO) negotiates a contract that minimizes agency costs,
which include the costs of 1) monitoring the executive, 2) bonding by the executive to
maximize shareholder value, and 3) the residual divergence between the actions
selected by the executive and share value maximizing actions. 24 Most of the
theoretical and empirical literature on executive pay proceeds from the assumption that
these arrangements are selected to minimize agency costs and maximize shareholder
value.
However, many observed features of the executive pay landscape appear to be
inconsistent with the share value maximizing, or optimal contracting, model of the
executive pay process. 25 An alternative, managerial power view of the executive pay
setting process posits that the outside directors who are charged with negotiating
executive pay lack the proper incentives and tools to bargain effectively and that their
independence is undermined by executive influence over the board and as well as by
board dynamics that discourage dissent. 26 Under this view, executive pay is not
simply a tool to combat agency costs; it is a product of the agency problem. 27 The
managerial power view does not suggest that there are no constraints on executive pay.
Under this view, the threat or reality of investor and financial press outrage plays an
important role in disciplining compensation.
Of course, the managerial power view and the optimal contracting view of the pay
setting process may co-exist, providing relatively more or less explanatory power at
particular firms. 28 Moreover, under both theories there is an overriding cap on
managerial value extraction that is determined by external market forces – markets for
corporate control, capital, products, and even the managerial labor market. However,

23

Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
24
Id. Some degree of agency cost is unavoidable in the modern, widely-held corporation.
25
BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note X; Bebchuk et al., supra note X;
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X; Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note X;
Frydman & Jenter, supra note X, at 89-94.
26
Bebchuk et al., supra note X.
27
Bebchuk et al., supra note X.
28
Bebchuk et al., supra note X. A third view characterizes the compensation setting process as a team
production problem in which the board serves as a mediating hierarch between competing stakeholders
– the executives, employees, creditors, and shareholders – who make firm-specific investments in the
company. This theory predicts that compensation arrangements would not be designed to maximize
shareholder value, but to balance the interests of the stakeholders. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
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proponents of the managerial power view argue that these external market forces
permit considerable slack, leaving one to question the extent to which such forces
actually limit executive rent extraction. 29
The managerial power view of the executive pay setting process suggests two
major sources of inefficiency. The focus of much of the literature is on the distortions
in compensation design that follow from an outrage constraint and the attendant
costs. 30 Under the managerial power view, transparency and salience of pay are
critical. If all channels of compensation were perfectly transparent and equally salient
to investors, compensation design would be irrelevant under this model. Outrage
would simply be a function of total appropriation, and, although total pay would
remain excessive, firms would select compensation elements so as to minimize agency
costs and maximize shareholder value. But appropriation is not transparent.
Managers may be able to increase their pay by camouflaging compensation and
avoiding outrage. Doing so, however, results in compensation choices that are not
share value maximizing. 31
This Article is focused on a second source of inefficiency. This inefficiency,
which is more fully described in section C below, arises from the transfer to executives
of excessive compensation and the distortions in investment behavior that result. In all
likelihood, there is both a systematic and a firm-specific element to excessive
compensation. Managers, boards, and negotiating processes are heterogeneous. Some
boards may negotiate effectively with respect to executive pay. Importantly, however,
as long as executives receive excessive pay at a substantial number of companies, pay
levels will be systematically higher.
The reason is that companies do not set pay levels in a vacuum. Guided by
compensation consultants whose primary role is to collect and summarize executive
pay data, companies set compensation based on the pay practices of their peers, a
process known as “benchmarking.” 32 As a result, lax pay practices at some firms tend
to drive up executive pay levels generally. The problem is made worse by the Lake
Wobegon effect. 33 Because no board believes (or is willing to publicly admit) that its
executives are below average, firms generally seek to pay their executives at or above

29

Bebchuk et al., supra note X. For example, it seems quite clear that given the defensive mechanisms
available to target management, the hostile takeover market would provide little disciplinary force on
senior executive pay. See Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2002, at A18.
30
BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note X, at 64-66; Bebchuk & Fried, Agency
Problem, supra note X, at 75-76; Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 786-88; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra
note X, at 300-01; Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note X.
31
Bebchuk et al., supra note X.
32
See Bizjak et al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient
Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152 (2008).
33
Lake Wobegon, of course, is radio personality Garrison Keillor’s mythical Minnesota community
where “all the children are above average.” See http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/.
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the 50th percentile of peer executive compensation. 34 This practice of benchmarking
with targets at or above the 50th percentile leads to upward ratcheting in executive
pay. 35 Perversely, the upward ratcheting problem may have been exacerbated by
enhanced executive compensation disclosure requirements promulgated by the SEC
over the last twenty years. Evidence suggests that enhanced disclosure may have done
more to increase below average elements of pay at lagging firms than to reduce above
average elements at “leading” firms. 36 The result, as my colleague Fred Tung recently
suggested to me, is “market failure with an arms race.”
In sum, the managerial power view posits that executives extract rents as a result
of inadequate bargaining by outside directors and slack in the capital, products, and
corporate control markets. The effect of excessive compensation is felt even at wellgoverned firms given the prevalence of benchmarking, and the impact is exacerbated
by enhanced disclosure and upward ratcheting. Nonetheless, despite benchmarking
and ratcheting, there is heterogeneity in executive pay. Of course it is difficult to
pinpoint the degree of excess compensation in any particular case, but some executive
pay packages appear clearly excessive even as a relative matter. 37
C. The Negative Consequences of Excessive Executive Pay
As noted in the previous section, the managerial power view predicts that
compensation design will be distorted as managers seek to minimize outrage and
maximize their pay. Such distortions are obviously inefficient. This section addresses
another set of inefficiencies that relate more directly to the increased transfer of value
from companies to executives that results from market failure. It begins by

34

Bizjak et al., supra note X, at 153 (finding that the vast majority of S&P 500 firms sampled
“target[ed] pay levels at or above the 50th percentile of the peer group”). In addition, companies often
select peer groups with an eye towards justifying high executive pay levels. See Michael Faulkender &
Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups, 96 J. FIN.
ECON. 257, 259 (2010); John Bizjak et al, Are All CEOs Above Average? An Empirical Analysis of
Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538 (2011).
35
Bizjak et al., supra note X, at 155.
36
For example, Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda find that after enhanced disclosure requirements for
perks, firms that provided a low level of perks compared with their peers increased perks in the second
year after enhanced disclosure was mandated, while firms that provided a relatively high level of perks
did not reduce them. The authors provide additional evidence suggesting that the increase in perks by
formerly low-perk firms reflected actual ratcheting rather than simply increased disclosure. Yaniv
Grinstein et al., The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure (Johnson Sch. Res. Paper Series, No.
06-2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108707.
37
Outliers exist at both the high and low ends of the executive pay spectrum. See, e.g., Gretchen
Morgenson, The Best and the Worst in Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2006, § 3, at 1; Daniel
Costello, The Drought Is Over (at Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at BU1 (describing
excessive CEO pay packages in 2010, including Viacom CEO Philippe Dauman who made $84.5
million for nine months of work); Sophia J.W. Hamm et al., One Dollar CEO Salaries: An Empirical
Examination of the Determinants and Consequences (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796403) (examining CEOs who receive $1/year salaries, finding that a
subset are not compensated through other means, and finding positive market reaction in this subset of
cases).
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considering who bears the cost of this transfer. It follows by examining the effect of
this transfer on investment in the corporate sector, on executive labor markets outside
the public company context, and on the growing inequality of wealth in the U.S.
1. Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation?
Corporate governance experts assume, explicitly or implicitly, that excessive
executive pay comes at the expense of shareholders who bear residual corporate gains
or losses. 38 Certainly this is true in the first instance. But the question is whether the
burden is shifted as shareholders respond to reduced returns in the corporate sector.
As I discuss at greater length elsewhere, 39 the assumption that shareholders bear the
burden over both the short and the long term seems reasonable to the extent that
executive pay is high at a particular company because of a particularly strong
executive or a particularly ineffective board. It would be difficult for shareholders to
pass on the cost of excessive pay in that situation to consumers or labor.
But it is less obvious that shareholders bear the long-term cost of executive pay
that is higher across the board than it would be if the optimal contracting model
provided a complete picture of pay practices. Systematically higher pay that results
from lax governance at some firms, comparative benchmarking, and an executive
labor pool that is infected by these practices might be analogized to a corporate level
income tax. Like an actual tax, the economic tax created by systematically excessive
pay reduces net shareholder returns, which may have an effect on the allocation of
capital. If the analogy is sound, one might look to the extensive literature on the
incidence of the corporate income tax for clues as to whether, or how, the cost of
systematically excessive pay might be shifted.
Unfortunately, both the theoretical and empirical literatures on the incidence of the
corporate income tax are inconclusive. Nonetheless, this literature suggests that it
would be a mistake to assume that shareholders bear the entire long-term cost of an
increase in the corporate tax rate and, if the analogy is sound, of a systematic increase
in excessive executive pay.
a. Corporate Income Tax Incidence: Theory and Evidence
Early theoretical work on the incidence of the corporate income tax employed a
closed economy general equilibrium model that included two sectors – corporate and
non-corporate – and two factors of production – labor and capital. 40 The result under
this model is that the incidence of a corporate tax, and, by extension, the incidence of
systematically excessive executive pay falls not solely on shareholders but on all
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E.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 785.
David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation? (June 23, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
40
Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962).
39
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holders of capital in the economy. 41 Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija explain the model
by analogizing to the imposition of a toll on one of two parallel highways. 42 At first,
those who drive on the road with the new toll bear the entire cost. However, over time,
drivers abandon the toll road for the non-tolled road, which increases congestion and
the cost of using the non-tolled road and reduces the congestion and cost of using the
tolled road. In equilibrium, the total cost of driving on the toll and non-toll roads must
be the same. Similarly, when a tax is imposed on investors in one sector of the
economy, reducing returns to that sector, capital will shift into the non-taxed sector,
depressing returns in that sector and increasing returns in the taxed sector, until aftertax returns equilibrate. 43
This model of corporate tax incidence is quite elegant but its assumption of a
closed economy and fixed factors of production is unrealistic. Most of the theoretical
work in recent years has been focused on exploring the incidence question under more
realistic, open economy assumptions. 44 Under these models, if one assumes that
capital is perfectly mobile internationally and that domestic and foreign traded goods
are perfect substitutes, the incidence of an increase in the corporate tax, and by
analogy of a systematic increase in excessive executive pay, falls primarily on the
immobile factor of production – domestic labor. 45 The idea is that wages are based on
the productivity of labor, which is a function of invested capital. So if capital moves
abroad, foreign workers are better off, but domestic workers suffer.
However, incidence under these models is highly dependent on one’s assumptions.
If foreign and domestic traded goods are not perfect substitutes, the open economy
model begins to look like the closed economy model and capital is predicted to bear
the bulk of the burden rather than labor. 46
To complicate the theoretical incidence analysis further, Alan Auerbach has
suggested several reasons that shareholders might be unable to shift the burden of a
corporate tax under any of these models. 47 For example, to the extent that the

41

Id.
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES
79-80 (4th ed. 2008).
43
One may ask why workers bear none of the burden under the closed economy model. The answer, in
a nutshell, is that the model assumes that workers receive pay equal to the marginal product of their
labor and that the marginal product is a function of the amount of capital invested in the economy.
Under this model, the total amount of capital invested in the economy is fixed and thus total returns to
labor are fixed. See Harberger, supra note X, at 216.
44
Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, in 20 TAX POL’Y AND
THE ECON. 1 (James M. Poterba ed., 2006); Jane G. Gravelle & Kent A. Smetters, Does the Open
Economy Assumption Really Mean That Labor Bears the Burden of a Capital Income Tax?, ADVANCES
IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 2006 Issue 1, art. 3; William C. Randolph, International Burdens of the
Corporate Income Tax (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/75xx/doc7503/2006-09.pdf.
45
Randolph, supra note X, at 26.
46
Gravelle & Smetters, supra note X, at 10-12.
47
Auerbach, supra note X, at 1.
42
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corporate tax is a tax on economic rents, such as monopoly profits, or on other
advantages that are specific to the corporate form, shareholders will not be able to shift
the burden of the tax. 48 As Altshuler, Harris, and Toder suggest, given Auerbach’s
insights, it is possible that shareholders bear most (or even all) of the long-run costs
associated with an increase in the corporate income tax. 49
Given the indeterminacy of the theoretical literature on corporate tax incidence,
several economists have attempted to get at the question from an empirical angle.
Most have found that an increase in corporate tax rates burdens labor, at least to some
extent. 50 Unfortunately, empirical work in this area is also subject to criticism, and no
economist that I am aware of considers the matter settled.
b. Is the Corporate Tax Incidence Analogy Sound?
Setting aside the indeterminacy of the theoretical and empirical results for a
moment, we must consider whether the analogy between corporate tax incidence and
the incidence of systematically excessive executive pay is reasonably sound.
Consideration of the various underlying assumptions suggests that it is. An important
assumption in maintaining the analogy between the corporate income tax and
systematically excessive executive pay under the closed economy model is that the
executive pay excesses do not infect the entire economy. In other words, it is
important that investors be able to avoid an increase in executive pay by shifting
capital to other sectors. This seems to be a reasonable assumption. There would seem
to be numerous domestic investment sectors, such as real estate, that would not be
tainted by excessive executive pay.
Another important assumption is that markets other than the executive labor
market are reasonably efficient. There is little reason to think that market failure in the
executive pay setting process results in inefficiencies in the products, capital, or (nonexecutive) labor markets. 51
Moreover, the analogy between the corporate tax and excessive executive pay
appears to remain strong as we move from a closed to an open economy setting. A
systematic increase in U.S. executive pay that reduces returns on domestic shares
should lead to an exodus of capital that reduces domestic wage rates in equilibrium.
The degree to which this will be the case, and the degree to which domestic capital and

48

Id., at 25-28.
Rosanne Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 VA.
TAX REV. 355, 361 (2010).
50
Mihir A. Desai et al., Dividend Policy Inside the Multinational Firm, Fin. Mgmt., Spring 2007, at 5;
Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna Mathur, Taxes and Wages, (Mar. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.aei.org/paper/24063).
51
Although senior executives have an obvious interest in maximizing their own compensation, their
interest in holding down non-executive labor costs should be similar to the shareholders’ interest. .
Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 774; Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 553-57 (1984).
49
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labor bear the burden, would depend on the substitutability of foreign and domestic
traded goods just as it does in the corporate tax incidence analysis.
An open economy model would collapse into a closed economy model if changes
in systematically excessive U.S. executive pay were matched abroad, 52 but despite the
fact that executives are more mobile internationally than rank and file workers, crosscountry differences in executive compensation suggest that there is not a global
executive labor market. Despite signs of growing convergence, cross country
comparisons of pay practices suggest that U.S. executive pay remains exceptional,
with U.S. executives receiving more compensation than their international peers at
comparably sized companies and with U.S. executives receiving a much larger fraction
of their compensation in the form of equity.53 These differences do not in themselves
confirm that U.S. executive pay is excessive. Some commentators have suggested that
because of differences in ownership structure and/or culture, executive talent may be
more important to the success or failure of firms in the U.S. than abroad.54
Nonetheless, increases or decreases in systematically excessive executive pay in the
U.S. are unlikely to be matched overseas.
In sum, setting aside the special cases discussed by Auerbach, the consensus of
economists is that the burden of the corporate income tax in an open economy is
shifted to a significant degree to non-corporate capital and to labor. But at that point
the consensus ends. If the analogy between the corporate income tax and
systematically excessive executive pay is sound from an incidence perspective, the
incidence of the latter is indeterminate as well. Nonetheless, it is important to
recognize that we should not simply assume that corporate shareholders bear the entire
long-run cost of systematically excessive executive pay. Some and perhaps most of
that cost may be passed on as shareholders shift their capital elsewhere in search of
greater returns.

52

It is well recognized that the open economy corporate tax incidence models collapse into a closed
economy model if all countries raise and lower corporate tax rates together. Matthew H. Jensen &
Aparna Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on Labor: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 2011 Tax Notes
Today 111-13 (May 10, 2011), at 1083.
53
See Brian J. Hall, Incentive Strategy II: Executive Compensation and Ownership Structure 6,7
(Harvard Business School Case Study, 2002) (providing data demonstrating greater total pay and
greater equity pay for U.S. executives than for executives of similarly sized firms abroad but arguing
that U.S. style pay practices are spreading internationally); Nuno Fernandes et al., The Pay Divide:
(Why) Are U.S. Top Executives Paid More? (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639) (finding that U.S. executives are paid more than their foreign
counterparts and receive more equity pay but concluding that the differences are largely explained by
firm, ownership, and board characteristics and by the riskiness of equity-based compensation); Randall
S. Thomas, International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends 8 (Vanderbilt Law Sch.
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 26, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265122)
(demonstrating that non-U.S. executives receive less total compensation and less performance-oriented
pay, but also providing evidence of a shift towards U.S. pay practices).
54
See Bebchuk et al., supra note X, at 842-3; Susan J. Stabile, My Executive Makes More Than Your
Executive: Rationalizing Executive Pay in a Global Economy, 14 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 63, 67 n.18 (2001)
(citing IRA T. KAY, CEO PAY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: HELPING THE U.S. WIN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC WAR 25) (1998).
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2. Effect of Excessive Executive Pay on Corporate Investment
The incidence discussion from the previous subsection tells us something about the
distribution of the burden of systematically excessive pay extracted by executives.
The effect of these transfers on the inequality of wealth in the U.S. is discussed in
subsection 4 below. This subsection considers the economic inefficiency that is
associated with the transfer of excessive executive pay.
To the extent that shareholders are unable to pass the cost of excess compensation
on through reallocation of capital, the result is a pure transfer. For example, if an
increase in excessive executive pay reduces monopoly rents, it will not distort
investment. Executives will simply capture a greater share of those rents, and
investors a smaller share of those rents, than they did previously. However, to the
extent that reduced returns on company shares cause shareholders to re-allocate capital
elsewhere, excess executive pay acts as a brake on domestic corporate investment.
Under the closed economy model, capital shifts out of the corporate sector and into the
non-corporate sector. Under the open economy models, capital may shift abroad.
Induced solely by excessive executive pay, these distortions are inefficient.
How exactly does this work? In the short run, of course, unexpected increases in
excessive pay, say from an exogenous shock that loosens the outrage constraint, 55 are
likely to be borne by existing shareholders. But over the long run, the prospect of
excessive pay should be taken into consideration at the initial public offering stage,
leading to fewer companies entering the public markets, because of the systematic
nature of the excessive pay problem and the difficulty that promoters would have in
bonding themselves to not taking an (inflated) market level of compensation. The
prospect of excessive executive pay also would make it more expensive to raise money
through a secondary stock offering, but secondary offerings are fairly rare occurrences
for a variety of reasons. 56 In sum, to the extent that domestic corporate shareholders
reallocate capital and do not bear the entire burden of systematically excessive
executive pay, the extraction of that pay acts as an inefficient encumbrance on
domestic corporate investment. 57

55

For example, Bebchuk & Grinstein posit that the bull market of the 1990s loosened the outrage
constraint which permitted executives to increase their compensation. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note
X, at 300-01.
56
Secondary stock offerings are generally thought to suffer from an adverse selection or “lemons”
problem. Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
61, 74 (1986); Robyn McLaughlin et al., The Information Content of Corporate Offerings of Seasoned
Securities: An Empirical Analysis, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1998 at 32-33; see generally George A.
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON.
488 (1970). Contra E. Han Kim & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Corporate Governance and Seasoned
Equity
Offerings
5
(Feb.
22,
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1339642) (finding no empirical support for adverse selection hypothesis).
57
Note that the assumption that investors reallocate capital in response to extraction of excessive
executive pay is not inconsistent with the argument that capital markets do not tightly constrain that
pay. First, as the models suggest, in the new equilibrium that is established following reallocation,
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3. Infection of Other Executive Labor Markets
There is a possible externality associated with excessive public company executive
pay. The market failure in the pay setting process at public companies may spill over
to private companies and possibly even non-profit organizations. In recent work
examining executive compensation at portfolio companies held by private equity
investors, Robert Jackson found no statistically significant difference between private
and public company executive pay after controlling for firm size and the riskiness of
pay packages. 58 Pay negotiations in the private equity setting should reflect arm’s
length bargaining, 59 but Jackson’s finding of roughly equivalent pay levels in the two
sectors does not rebut the notion that public company executive pay is excessive. It
seems likely that private equity portfolio companies compete with public companies
for executive talent and that the pool is dominated by the large public companies. 60 If
so, private equity portfolio companies may be price takers and these investors may
bear part of the cost of the inefficiency of the public company executive pay market.
4. Impact on Growing Inequality of Wealth
Inequality of wealth in the U.S. has increased markedly in the last several decades.
Recent data suggests that growth in executive pay may be a significant contributing
factor.

returns to capital in different sectors or markets are equal. Second, U.S. executives and company
directors may have some diffuse interest in the amount of capital invested in the domestic corporate
sector, but presumably this interest is secondary to other concerns – for the executives, the prospect of
additional compensation; for the outside directors, managing outrage.
58
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation 22-23 (2009) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
59
Private equity funds are pooled investment vehicles that combine the business selection and
management expertise of fund managers such as Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR with passive
investments by pension funds, universities, other institutions, and a few high wealth individuals. Steven
N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at
123. They acquire “portfolio companies” through engaging in leveraged buyouts of existing public
companies or divisions of public companies or through the purchase of portfolio companies held by
other private equity funds. Id. at 124-28. Private equity funds and the boards they create are active
monitors and managers of these portfolio companies. Id. at 131-32. As a result, the fund managers
should not be disabled by the agency problems that plague public company executive pay processes.
60
David I. Walker, Executive Pay Lessons from Private Equity, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1209, 1218 (2011). In
addition, the public company and portfolio company pay numbers may not be perfectly comparable.
Jackson finds that portfolio company CEO pay often includes a “deal bounty” paid to an incumbent
CEO to induce his cooperation in facilitating the private equity buyout. Jackson, supra note X, at 48.
Absent deal bounties, average portfolio company CEO pay might be lower than public company pay by
a statistically significant amount. Walker, supra, at 1217.
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The share of total U.S. pre-tax income (excluding capital gains) earned by the top
0.1 percent of earners increased from 2% in 1981 to 8% in 2008. 61 During the early
1980s, pre-tax income inequality was only modestly greater in the U.S. than it was in
Europe. 62 Today that difference is dramatic. 63 In terms of income inequality, the U.S.
now looks more like a developing country, with income inequality similar to that of
Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Jamaica. 64 Although income inequality is to some
extent a desirable result of a thriving, capitalist economy, at some level inequality
becomes a serious policy concern.
Recent data provided by Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, and Bradley Heim suggest that
increases in executive pay have contributed substantially to the growth in income
inequality. Analyzing individual income tax data, these authors found that executives,
managers, supervisors, and financial professionals accounted for about 60% of the top
0.1% of income earners in the U.S. in 2005. 65 Non-financial sector, i.e., “main street,”
executives alone accounted for about 30% of the top 0.1%. 66 These authors also found
that the larger group of executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals
accounted for about 70% of the increase in the share of national income going to the
top 0.1% of the income distribution between 1979 and 2005. 67
Excessive executive pay may contribute to income inequality from two directions.
First, as demonstrated in the following figure, the growth in U.S. income inequality
tracks the growth in public company executive pay. Of course, the growth in
executive pay over this period does not necessarily result from market failure. This
point is contested, 68 but for the purposes of this Article, I am assuming that at least a
61

Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. J.
ECON. 1 (2003). A longer updated version was published in TOP INCOMES OVER THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: A CONTRAST BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES (A.B. Atkinson &
Thomas Piketty eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) .
62
Jon Bakija et al., Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and Causes of Changing Income
Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data 72 fig.1 (Nov. 2010) (unpublished manuscript,
available
at
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf).
63
Id.
64
CIA
–
The
World
Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2172rank.html?countryName=Nicaragua&countryCode=nu&regionCode=ca&rank
=47 (last visited Aug 16, 2011).
65
Bakija et al, supra note X, at 3, 51 tbl.3. In 2005, the income threshold for the top 0.1% of income
earners (excluding capital gains), was $1.25 million (in 2007 dollars). Id. at 15-16.
66
Id. at 51 tbl.3. In an earlier study, Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh argued that public company
executives accounted for too small a fraction of high income earners to explain much of the increase in
income inequality. Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to
the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1004 (2010). However, Kaplan and Rauh were
only able to identify the occupations of 17.4% of the top 0.1% of income earners. Bakija, Cole and
Heim identify 99% of these individuals. Bakija et al, supra note X, at 1.
67
Bakija et al, supra note X, at 3.
68
Gabaix and Landier have proposed a model involving competitive matching of CEO talent and firms.
The model predicts that average compensation should move with firm size, and the model explains the
increase in pay over time, as well as cross-industry and cross-country pay observations. The authors
find very little dispersion in CEO talent at the largest firms, but given the tremendous amount of assets
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part of the growth in executive pay reflects market failure. Moreover, as suggested in
subsection II.C.3 above, excessive pay in the public company executive labor may
infect the private company executive labor market. Thus, excesses in both markets
may contribute to the growing share of income captured by executives. 69

under management and a multiplier effect, the model can explain large pay differentials. Xavier Gabaix
& Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008). The idea
that small differences in talent are consistent with large differences in pay was also explored by Charles
P. Himmelberg & R. Glenn Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-forPerformance
Sensitivity
(Mar.
6,
2000)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=236089).
On the other hand, Bebchuk and Grinstein analyzed increases in executive pay between 1993 and 2003
and concluded that the growth in pay could not be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and
industry mix. Taking the managerial power approach, they suggested that the bull market of the 1990s
weakened the outrage constraint, allowing boards to increase executive pay, and that the design of
equity compensation reduced the salience of this pay, permitting transfers of value that would have been
inconceivable if paid in cash. Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note X, at 283. In a similar vein, Murphy
and Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck argue that the favorable accounting treatment of options in the 1990s
led boards to systematically undervalue this form of compensation. Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Pay
in New Economy Firms, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 129, 143-45 (2003); Michael C. Jensen et al,
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix
Them 39 (Harvard Negotiations, Org., and Mkt Unit Research Paper Series No. 04-28, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305
69
In the figure that follows, income share data was retrieved from The World Top Incomes Database,
maintained by Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, available here:
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/. From 1993 forward, CEO pay data is from
S&P’s Execucomp database, and reflects median pay of S&P 500 firms, excluding financials and
utilities. Data from prior years is taken from Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid
Like Bureaucrats, 113 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998) (1981-1991 data based on a sample of Forbes 500
companies) and Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J.
ACCT. & FIN. 3 (2002) (1992 data for S&P 500 industrial companies). All pay data is inflated to 2008
dollars based on the CPI index.
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Second, to the extent that excessive executive pay results in capital shifting abroad,
reduced productivity of domestic labor, and reduced wage rates at the low end of the
income scale, excessive pay would contribute to the growing inequality of wealth in
the U.S. by reducing the denominator of the equation. In other words, excessive
executive pay would result not only in the rich getting richer, but in the poor getting
poorer, in both a relative and an absolute sense.
5. Distortion in Executive Labor Markets
Before moving on to consider a possible remedy for the excessive executive pay
problem, I will briefly mention one other distortion that may result from the market
failure. If executive pay is systematically higher than it would be in an efficient labor
market, we should expect that the number of candidates for senior executive roles
would be greater, as well. 70 MBAs or other individuals choosing between pursuing a
career as an investment banker, lawyer, or corporate executive would tend to be
attracted by the rents available to those who succeed in the competition to become
senior executives. 71
70

Emmanuel Saez, Direct or Indirect Tax Instruments for Redistribution: Short-Run Versus Long-Run,
88 J. PUB. ECON. 503, 505 (2004); Cf. Carried Interest, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Joseph Bankman, Professor of Law and Business, Stanford
Law School) (arguing that the carried interest subsidy distorts career choice)
71
For evidence that MBA career choices vary based on market factors, see Paul Oyer, The Making of an
Investment Banker: Stock Market Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income, 63 J. FIN. 2601 (2008)

19

A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem

III. A TAX RESPONSE TO THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM: A SURTAX

The primary aim of this Article is to describe and evaluate a tax response to the
problem of excessive executive compensation. The idea is to combine a surtax applied
to executive pay above a certain threshold with investor tax relief. The proposal
responds to each of the negative consequences of excessive executive pay that were
discussed in the previous Part. A surtax placed on excessive pay would reduce the
after-tax income of executives, which responds to the unfairness of executives
receiving excessive compensation, to the effect of excess executive pay on income
inequality, and to the distortion in the executive labor market created by the existence
of these rents. Using the proceeds of the surtax to provide investor tax relief would
mitigate the inefficient distortion in investment incentives created by the extraction of
excess compensation.
The two elements of this proposal – the surtax and investor tax relief – need not
necessarily be linked. One could support one and not the other. 72 Accordingly, this
Part makes the case for the surtax, and the argument for providing investor tax relief is
deferred until Part IV. However, that Part will argue that there are strong economic
and political reasons to link these two elements in this context.
This Part begins by briefly outlining how an executive pay surtax might be
designed and by describing why a surtax would help alleviate several of the problems
associated with excessive executive pay. The bulk of this Part addresses the effect of a
surtax in much greater detail, focusing on potential labor supply distortions, shifting of
tax incidence, and avoidance. It concludes that there is reason to be concerned that a
surtax might be partially “grossed up” by employers, but that otherwise a surtax would
be a relatively efficient, non-distortionary tax.
A. An Overview of an Executive Pay Surtax and its Benefits
As envisioned in this Article, a surtax would be applied to compensation received
by an executive within the taxable year in excess of a threshold. The surtax would
piggyback on the existing tax treatment of executive pay. Thus, all elements of
executive pay that are currently subject to federal income tax would be subject to the
surtax, and the amounts subject to the tax would be exactly the same. The surtax
would reach salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts, the vesting of
restricted stock, the exercise of non-qualified stock options, and the receipt of various
taxable perks, such as personal use of corporate jets.

(demonstrating a relationship between MBA placement in the investment banking sector and the 2-year
return on the S&P 500 as of graduation).
72
See infra note x [cross reference footnote citing Mirrlees].
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The surtax could be set at a fixed percentage of all compensation in excess of a
threshold, e.g., a 10% surtax on all compensation received during the year in excess of
$1 million, or the surtax could be graduated to apply higher surtax rates to greater
compensation levels. 73 The surtax could be based on a single threshold that would be
applicable to the executives of all U.S. public companies, or the threshold could be
customized based on factors such as firm size. The surtax could be limited to
executives of public companies, but, as discussed below, there are arguments in favor
of applying the surtax (perhaps at a lower rate) to executives of large private
companies and even to executives of non-profit organizations. 74
The idea behind imposing a surtax on executive pay is to extract a portion of
“unearned” compensation. A surtax would be expected to produce revenue that could
be redirected, but it would not be intended to change the level or composition of pretax executive pay. If the imposition of a surtax did result in downward pressure on
executive pay, all the better; although, for reasons explained below, I would not
anticipate that result. This section discusses the benefits of imposing a surtax under
the assumption that the tax would be borne by the executives and would not distort
executive behavior or compensation design. Those assumptions will be considered
fully in subsection B below.
If these assumptions hold, the most obvious result of imposing a surtax on
executive pay would be to reduce the after-tax compensation of executives subject to
the surtax, offsetting to some degree the excessive pre-tax pay that results from the
73

To provide a sense of magnitude, aggregate compensation in excess of $1 million for each of the top
five executives at over 2000 public companies included in S&P’s Execucomp database for 2008 was
$20.2 billion. See supra note x and accompanying text for a description of Execucomp coverage. The
data reported in this note are based on the Execucomp variable TDC2. TDC2 includes the salary, bonus
payments, long term incentive payouts, perks, gains on stock option exercise, and the grant date value of
restricted stock. Each element aligns with taxable compensation except for the latter. Restricted stock
is taxed on vesting, not grant. Nonetheless, TDC2 provides a reasonable approximation of annual
taxable executive compensation.
Twenty billion dollars is a conservative estimate of aggregate annual public company executive pay in
excess of $1 million per executive. The database only includes information for the top five executives
at each company. Some executives below this rank at very large companies receive pay above this
threshold. In addition, the database only includes data on former and present S&P 1500 firms.
Executives at some smaller public companies may receive compensation in excess of $1 million per
year.
Naturally, if we include executives of private companies, the aggregate amount of pay in excess of this
threshold would increase further. Bakija, Cole, and Heim estimate that in 2005 there were slightly more
private company executives earning more than $1 million per year than public company executives and
that in aggregate these private company executives captured a larger share of national income than the
public company executives. Bakija et al, supra note X, at 51 tbl.3. Thus, it seems likely that including
private company executives would result in a figure for aggregate annual executive pay in excess of $1
million per executive of at least twice the $20 billion figure estimated for the top five executives of
Execucomp firms.
74
See supra note X and accompanying text. The existence of multinational firms might create certain
administrative challenges. The baseline assumption of this Article is that an executive pay surtax would
be limited to citizens and resident aliens who already pay U.S. taxes on their compensation.
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deficiencies in the executive labor market. A surtax would respond directly to the
unfairness of executives extracting “unearned” compensation, and a surtax would
mitigate the effect of executive labor market failure on income inequality. It is
assumed that a surtax would not affect pre-tax executive pay, but that is irrelevant.
The real concern is equality of after-tax income and wealth, not of pre-tax income per
se. Thus, from an income equality standpoint, the imposition of a surtax would be
equivalent to a reduction in pre-tax pay.
An additional benefit of reducing after-tax executive pay would be to mitigate the
distortion in career choices that likely results from excessive executive compensation.
The assumption at this point is that a surtax would not affect the behavior of existing
executives, but that does not mean that it would not affect the behavior of MBA
recipients and other individuals who would consider corporate management among a
number of potential careers. In all likelihood, a surtax would affect career decisions.
Over the long term, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals consider relative
after-tax rewards in making career choices. 75
Another advantage of a surtax (versus, say, a cap on executive pay) is that a surtax
would produce a fund that could be used to provide investor tax relief or simply to
reduce other distortionary taxes, such as the labor income tax. 76 Use of those funds is
discussed in Part IV.
A surtax applied to executive pay would not be unprecedented. Currently, I.R.C.
§ 4999 imposes a 20% surtax on “golden parachute” severance payments received by
executives that exceed a certain amount. 77 Of course, an alternative way of providing
incentives through the tax code is to limit deductibility at the corporate level. I.R.C.
§ 162(m) limits the deduction for senior executive pay that is not performance based to
$1 million per executive per year, and § 280G disallows deductions for golden
parachute payments that are subject to the § 4999 excise tax. 78 Commentators
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See supra note x [footnote citing Saez, Bankman & Fleischer].
Although the main thrust of the surtax is more redistributive than Pigovian, to the extent that the surtax
helps to correct a flaw in the long-term executive labor market it is Pigovian. A Pigovian tax is
intended to mitigate harmful externalities by causing actors to internalize these social costs. See
ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
76
N. Gregory Mankiw, One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at
BU6 (arguing that revenue generation is one advantage of imposing a carbon tax over increasing fuel
efficiency standards). Fullerton and Metcalf explain that revenue generation is not necessarily a benefit
to the imposition of regulatory taxes. But if regulation creates scarcity rents it is better that the
government capture these rents than that they be left with the regulated parties. Don Fullerton & Gilbert
E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect
Something for Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 232 (1998).
77
I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2006).
78
I.R.C. §§ 162(m), 280G (2006). Section 280G is discussed at greater length infra notes x-y and
accompanying text.
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generally agree that these tax incentives have not been successful, 79 and several have
argued for their repeal. 80 However, stand alone repeal of these provisions is politically
unthinkable, as repeal would appear to loosen the reins on executive pay. On the other
hand, combining repeal of these provisions with the adoption of the surtax envisioned
in this Article could be honestly and convincingly portrayed as regulatory reform
rather than regulatory relaxation. The repeal of §§ 162(m), 4999, and 280G would be
an attractive side benefit if it could be accomplished in conjunction with the
imposition of a surtax. 81
B. The Impact of a Surtax on Executive and Corporate Behavior
This section considers the likely effect of a surtax on executive and corporate
behavior. To reiterate the point made above, the idea behind an executive pay surtax
is redistribution, not behavioral distortion. 82 If the surtax placed downward pressure
on executive pay, that would be a bonus. In my view, a surtax would be deemed
successful if it resulted in the extraction of a portion of the rents received by
executives without materially affecting short- or medium-term corporate or executive
behavior.
The behavioral effects of a surtax can be divided into three categories that will be
addressed in turn – labor supply effects, shifting of tax incidence, and avoidance. This
section concludes that distortions created by a surtax are likely to be small, quite small
relative to the distortions created by coercive regulation of executive pay, an
alternative considered in Part V. Putting this in terms of public finance theory,
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Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in 14 TAX POL’Y AND
ECON. 1, 1-2 (James M. Poterba ed., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 2000); Gregg D. Polsky,
Controlling Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 881 (2007).
80
[Wolk, others]
81
I thank Andrew Lund and Gregg Polsky for this suggestion. Each of the existing tax rules likely
results in a burden on shareholders in the first instance and potentially on other suppliers of capital
and/or labor if investors readjust their portfolios in response to these taxes. See Joy Sabino Mullane,
Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 485 (2009).
82
It may be useful to compare the aim and effect of I.R.C § 162(m), which, unlike the surtax considered
here, was intended to shape behavior. As noted above § 162(m) limits the deductibility of nonperformance based pay received by certain senior executives, and this provision was a response to a
perceived market failure that resulted in excessive “safe” compensation. Congress was concerned that
executives, who at the time received their compensation mainly in the form of salary and guaranteed
bonuses, were acting too conservatively and that their interests were insufficiently aligned with those of
shareholders. Section 162(m) was not designed to produce revenue. It was intended to redirect
compensation into stock options and other performance based pay, and it had the intended effect. In
hindsight, of course, § 162(m) looks like a mistake. The tax rule may have contributed to the boom in
stock options that 1) made executives extremely wealthy when the stock market took off in the 1990s,
and 2) may have encouraged excessive risk taking in the financial sector that contributed to the 20072008 crisis. Hall & Liebman, supra note X [Bureaucrats], at 36 (finding that salary reductions post1993 were more than offset by additional stock option grants); Polsky, supra note X, at 917-20
(documenting the widespread belief among informed observers that § 162(m) contributed to the options
explosion, but also noting the lack of clear cut empirical evidence).
THE
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minimal expected distortion suggests that a surtax on executive pay might be a “good”
tax, bearing low efficiency costs. 83 The primary concern arising from this analysis is
that executive pay might be increased to compensate for the surtax. This “gross up”
concern will play a role in thinking about surtax design as well as the optimal use of
surtax proceeds in Part IV.
1. Executive Labor Supply and Income Elasticity 84
A surtax on executive pay would increase the effective marginal tax rate faced by
covered executives. For example, at current tax rates, the imposition of a flat 10%
surtax would increase the marginal federal rate to 45%, and increase marginal
combined federal and state rates to 50% or more. One might be concerned that an
increase in marginal tax rates of this magnitude might adversely impact executive
labor supply, but economists have concluded that the labor supply elasticity for
“prime-age males” is close to zero, 85 and this finding appears to hold even for high
income taxpayers. For example, Moffitt and Wilhelm studied the response of high
income males to the tax rate reductions enacted in 1986 and found no evidence that
hours worked were affected by the rate cut. 86
Adjusting hours worked is just one possible response to changes in tax rates.
Taxpayers might also respond by shifting the timing or type of income or by engaging
in greater or lesser tax avoidance activities. In a seminal 1995 paper, Martin Feldstein
argued that all responses to tax reflect deadweight losses, and stressed the importance
of looking beyond labor supply effects. 87 Recent studies embrace this view and
investigate the effect of taxes on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI).
High income taxpayers exhibit greater ETI than low or moderate income
taxpayers, probably because high income taxpayers have more flexibility to shift the
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See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 292 (6th ed. 2002) (explaining that the excess burden or
deadweight loss of a tax is a function of the degree of distortion in behavior resulting from substitution
away from the taxed factor).
84
For a general overview of the evidence concerning labor supply and taxable income elasticity of high
income taxpayers, see LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 80-90
(2008).
85
Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A
Critical Review, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1, on file with author); Joel
Slemrod, Methodological Issues in Measuring and Interpreting Taxable Income Elasticities, 51 NAT’L
TAX J. 773, 774 (1998). These studies focus on male individuals as a proxy for primary wage earners. I
would not expect any substantial difference in labor supply or taxable income elasticities between male
and female executives.
86
Robert A. Moffitt & Mark Wilhelm, Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of the Affluent, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 193, 221 (Joel B. Slemrod
ed., 2000). Moffitt and Wilhelm analyzed Survey of Consumer Finances data for male heads of
households between 25 and 54 years of age in 1983. The mean AGI for their high MTR (or “rich”)
subsample was $169,000 in 1983 and $287,115 in 1989, the second panel period. Id. at 205-206.
87
Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986
Tax Reform Act, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551, 552 (1995). See also Saez et al., supra note X, at 1 (noting that
“under some assumptions all responses to taxation are symptomatic of deadweight loss”).
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timing and composition of their income. 88
However, studies of executive
responsiveness to tax rates have failed to find significant non-transitory ETI.
Austan Goolsbee examined the responsiveness of corporate executives to the
increase in marginal tax rates that came into effect in 1993. 89 Goolsbee found a
significant reduction in taxable income, but he found that the reduction was almost
entirely attributable to acceleration in the exercise of stock options undertaken to gain
advantage of the lower 1992 tax rates. Once he eliminated stock option compensation
from his analysis, Goolsbee concluded that corporate executives essentially failed to
respond to the Clinton era tax hikes. 90
Hall and Liebman replicated Goolsbee’s analysis, extended it back through the
1980s, and concluded that the timing of option exercise was not explained by changes
in marginal tax rates, but by stock market movements. 91 Essentially, they found that
executives exercise options following a big run up in stock prices. Nonetheless, on the
question of the responsiveness of executives to changes in marginal tax rates, Hall and
Liebman’s findings were consistent with those of Goolsbee in that their elasticity
results “fail[ed] to suggest large permanent effects of marginal tax rates on taxable
income.” 92
Eissa and Giertz generated elasticity results that were similar to Goolsbee’s for the
Clinton era tax hike. 93 However, their analysis of the Bush era tax cuts generated
negative long-run elasticities, 94 and they concluded that their results, and Hall and
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Nada Eissa & Seth Giertz, Trends in High Incomes and Behavioral Responses to Taxation: Evidence
from Executive Compensation and Statistics of Income Data 2, (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper
No. 14, 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7711/2006-14.pdf (citing studies).
Eissa and Giertz generate ETI figures for high income taxpayers from IRS Statistics of Income data that
are an order of magnitude greater than the executive ETIs. Bradley T. Heim, The Effect of Recent Tax
Changes on Taxable Income: Evidence From a New Panel of Tax Returns, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 147, 156 tbl.4 (2009) estimates gross taxable income elasticities in excess of 1.0 for taxpayers
with incomes in excess of $500,000. His elasticity estimates for the entire population of taxpayers are
not significantly affected by adding controls for shifting income from C corporation to S corporation
form or across time, but he does not specifically address whether shifting may be contributing to the
elasticities he finds at the high end of the income distribution.
89
Austan Goolsbee, What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation,
108 J. POL. ECON. 352 (2000). The marginal tax rate (federal only) on income in excess of $250,000
increased from 31% to 39.6% in 1993.
90
Id. at 352. Excluding options, the elasticity was 0.14. Id. at 372.
91
Hall & Liebman, supra note X [Bureaucrats], at 2.
92
Id. at 41, n.19. As Goolsbee notes, “permanent” is a misnomer in this context. These analyses capture
changes in income occurring over a few years. They do not capture changes in choice of occupation,
the decision to retire early, or similar very long term effects of taxes. See Goolsbee, supra note X, at
366, n.15.
93
The authors calculated a non-transitory ETI of 0.19 for a large group of executives and a nontransitory ETI of 0.73 for executives earning in excess of $1 million. Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at
52 tbl.4.1, 59 tbl.4.8. To put these figures into perspective, net of tax share elasticities in excess of 1.0
are considered high. An elasticity greater than (1 – t)/t, where t is the tax rate, would result in an inverse
relationship between tax increases and revenue collection. Slemrod, supra note X, at 775.
94
Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 52 tbl.4.1, 59 tbl.4.8.
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Liebman’s, could not be considered definitive given the variation in elasticities
between periods and the generation of elasticities with signs that were the opposite of
those predicted by theory. 95 In sum, despite some inconsistent results, the literature
suggests that the long-run elasticity of the income of corporate executives to tax rate
changes is modest, much less than the elasticity of high income taxpayers generally. 96
Goolsbee’s analysis suggests that one response of corporate executives to changes
in tax rates might lie in the timing of the tax realization of equity compensation.
Although Goolsbee’s findings and interpretation were contested by Hall and Liebman,
it would not be surprising to observe accelerated exercise of vested, in-the-money
stock options occurring prior to the imposition of a surtax on executive pay, assuming
the lead time was adequate to arrange for early exercise. Such acceleration, however,
does not seem particularly problematic as long as the surtax that is enacted is
permanent. 97 First, as suggested by Hall and Liebman’s analysis, the impact of
marginal tax rates on option exercise may be of second order importance behind the
impact of market movements generally. Second, even if exercise is accelerated at the
margin, the result is simply the conversion of in-the-money options into stock, which
may have little effect on executive incentives. 98
2. Incidence and Economic Effect of an Executive Compensation Surtax
A surtax placed on executive pay would be borne by the executives and their firms
in some combination. In adopting a surtax, Congress could bar firms from explicitly
compensating executives for the increased taxes, but could not prevent firms from
increasing compensation to implicitly “gross up” covered executives. For several
reasons, however, it seems unlikely that executives would be fully grossed up with
respect to an executive pay surtax. Moreover, if one thought that partial gross ups
were likely, the surtax rate could be increased to achieve the desired reduction in
executive after-tax income.
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Id. at 2, 4.
Supra notes X. Victor Fleischer suggested to me that the tournament nature of the executive labor
market may help explain relatively low executive income elasticities. Over the long run, taxes may
affect career decisions, but once an executive has entered into and succeeded in the tournament to
become a senior executive, her labor supply is unlikely to be affected by changes in marginal tax rates.
See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 841 (1981) for a presentation of a tournament model of the executive labor market.
97
Of course no tax rule is actually permanent, but the idea here is of a nominally permanent measure
rather than a surtax analog of, e.g., a one-time tax holiday for repatriation of profits held outside the
U.S. See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, TAX-REPATRIATION HOLIDAY GATHERS SOME STEAM, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, June 23, 2011, http://wsj.com (search “Tax-Repatriation Holiday”).
98
As stock options move into the money, i.e., as it becomes more and more probable that they will be
exercised at a profit, they begin to look more and more like stock from an incentive perspective.
RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 577 (9th ed. 2008). Of course, an
executive who exercises an option may sell some of the underlying shares to satisfy the tax bill, but to
the extent that the underlying shares are retained the incentive properties of in-the-money options and
stock are similar.
96
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a. Incidence
At first blush, one might think that there would be little risk of executives passing
a surtax on to their firms. Given the extremely high income and wealth of public
company executives, particularly of large company CEOs, one might think that pay
levels serve more as markers of relative success and standing in the executive
And, of course, relative
firmament than as limitations on consumption.99
compensation rankings would be unaffected by a surtax placed on executive pay. By
this line of reasoning, one would expect executives to fully bear the impact of a surtax.
However, our experience with I.R.C. §§ 280G and 4999 suggests that the issue is
more complicated. 100 Enacted in 1984, these two provisions disallow corporate level
tax deductions for and impose an executive level excise tax on excessive severance or
“golden parachute” payments. Golden parachute payments are excessive under the tax
code if they exceed three times an executive’s average compensation over the five year
period leading up to the executive’s termination due to a change in corporate
control. 101 Congress apparently intended that the restriction on deductibility and
imposition of a surtax would limit golden parachute payments to three times average
compensation, and, initially, that was the result. Over time, however, companies
began to enter into golden parachute agreements that allowed for payments in excess
of three times average compensation and promised to gross up executives for the
excise tax, putting them in the economic position that they would have been in had
§§ 280G and 4999 never been enacted. 102
In cases in which executives were able to negotiate gross up provisions in their
golden parachute agreements, the executive level surtax was fully passed on to their
firms. The executives who negotiated these gross ups generally faced the prospect of
an extremely large after-tax payday, even without the gross up. Thus, the golden
parachute experience undermines the argument that executives only care about
nominal compensation.
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In a recent paper, Christa Bouwman finds that local geography affects CEO pay, and she presents
evidence suggesting that envy better explains the geographic effect than does local labor market
competition or the effect of leading firms in a local market. See Christa H.S. Bouwman, The Geography
of
Executive
Compensation
(Aug.
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/bouwman/downloads/BouwmanGeographyOfExecComp.pdf).
Alternatively, one might think that managers with power would already be extracting as much
compensation as possible within the outrage constraint prior to the imposition of a surtax and that the
adoption of a surtax would not enable them to extract any more. Hence, executives would not be able to
pass the surtax on to their firms. This argument is explored further infra.
100
David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, 96 TAX NOTES 851,
855 (2002).
101
The surtax on “excess parachute payments” is 20%. I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2006).
102
These golden parachute gross ups occurred despite the fact that the cost to firms often far exceeded
the benefit to the executives, given the fact that the gross up payments were also subject to the excise
tax and constituted non-deductible severance payments. Walker, supra note X [Tax Incentives], at 855.
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So why would an executive pay surtax be less likely to be grossed up, or less likely
to be fully grossed up? Without a convincing theory of gross ups, it is difficult to be
definitive, but there are several differences between the golden parachute example and
a compensation surtax that are suggestive.
First, it seems likely that a more specific provision, e.g., a surtax directed at one,
specific element of compensation – severance pay – would be grossed up than a more
general surtax. A board could conceivably conclude that a golden parachute equal to,
say, five times a CEO’s average salary was required in order to create the right
incentives for her to manage the sale of the company. The board might conclude that
with a lesser incentive the CEO might resist a takeover in order to preserve her
existing stream of compensation. 103 As a result, the board might conclude that a gross
up that preserves the five to one ratio would be worth the cost. 104 A surtax that would
be applied to all elements of executive pay would not create this kind of distortion.
Second, if one adheres to the managerial power view of the executive pay setting
process, one would recognize that there are important differences between grossing up
golden parachute payments and grossing up a general surtax on executive pay.
Compensation is most salient when it is paid, and golden parachute gross ups would be
paid only in the event of an executive’s termination in association with a change in
control. At that point, the executive, and in all likelihood her board, would be
departing. The constraint created by investor and financial press outrage over
perceived executive pay abuses would have much less force on departing executives
and overseers. 105
By contrast, a gross up, even an implicit gross up, of a general executive pay
surtax would show up as additional compensation in publicly available proxy
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Corporate boards and compensation consultants argue that golden parachute agreements play a
positive role in corporate governance by mitigating the incentives of incumbent managers to resist value
adding sales of a company in order to preserve their personal economic and non-pecuniary benefits. See
Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955 (1987).
104
Similar explanations can be given for other specific tax gross ups. For example, companies have
grossed up CEOs for taxes due on personal use of corporate aircraft in cases in which that use was
mandated by corporate security policies. David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO
Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006). Although the dollars at
stake would seemingly be small, a board might conclude that since it is requiring an executive to use
corporate aircraft, fairness requires that the executive not bear the taxes.
Note also that the existence of a golden parachute agreement acts as a takeover defense, and the larger
the after-tax cost of the golden parachute, the stronger the defense. Thus, executives of potential
takeover targets might push even harder for gross ups given the multiplier effect of I.R.C. §§ 280G and
4999.
105
The very act of entering into an executive employment agreement committing a firm to gross up an
executive for an excess golden parachute payment might be thought to induce outrage. However, until
recently, firms were not required to disclose the terms of gross up agreements in the executive
compensation discussion and analysis section of their proxy statements. Employment contracts would
have been included as exhibits to corporate filings, but gross up agreements buried in appended
employment agreements would have been much less salient and much less likely to produce outrage
than the eventual reported payments themselves.
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statements and in executive pay tables published annually by the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal. 106 These pre-tax levels of pay are highly salient to investors
and the financial press, and presumably the outrage constraint works, to the extent it
works at all, at the level of reported, pre-tax compensation. It is not obvious why the
imposition of an executive pay surtax would loosen the outrage constraint. Thus, it is
not clear that executives would have the capacity to extract a gross up, if one accepts
the managerial power view. 107
It is conceivable that outside directors might be willing to endure greater levels of
outrage associated with grossing up an executive pay surtax if they felt that gross ups
were in the shareholders’ interest and that shareholder outrage was misdirected. Some
outside directors might believe that the executives at their particular firms are not
overpaid, even if public company executives are overpaid generally. Such reasoning
would support a gross up. Thus, it would be important for Congress to stress the
systematic nature of the executive pay problem – the idea that, given the practice of
benchmarking, excess pay at poorly governed firms “infects” pay practices at well
governed firms. In other words, directors would need to be convinced that even if
their pay practices were beyond reproach, their shareholders were the victims of a
failed market and must not be further disadvantaged by surtax gross ups.
Presumably, a Congress that adopted a surtax approach would explicitly bar gross
ups. Congress might also require that compensation committee members certify in
their annual proxy materials that the surtax played no role in deliberations over
executive pay. 108 A bar would certainly prevent explicit, contractual, golden
parachute-type gross ups. Moreover, an exhortation not to compensate executives for
the surtax coupled with the requirement of an affirmative certification to that effect
might increase the effectiveness of the outrage constraint and provide boards with an
additional moral lever in refusing to gross up executives with respect to the surtax.
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To be sure, tax gross ups covering personal use of corporate aircraft and other perks are also
disclosed in annual proxy statements. However, these amounts are included in a catchall “other annual
compensation” category in the summary compensation table and, until recently, the gross up details
were either buried in footnotes to the statements or not provided at all. See Regulation S-K, Item
402(c)(2)(ix)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(ix)(B) (2011) (requiring disclosure of tax gross ups in the
“other compensation” category); Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities
Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,444A, 2006 WL 2589711 (Sept. 8, 2006) (adopting amendments to the disclosure requirements for
executive compensation that require separate identification and quantification of tax gross ups). An
implicit gross up of an executive pay surtax taking the form of increased salary, bonus, or incentive pay
would be disclosed in the appropriate pay category and presumably would be more salient.
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It is an oversimplification, but if executives have substantial influence over their own pay and if that
pay is limited by an outrage constraint, one would expect executives to increase their pay up to that
constraint. Pay would rise or fall only to the extent that factors internal or external to the company
served to tighten or loosen the outrage constraint.
108
Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) (requiring CEO/CFO certification of the accuracy of financial
statements).
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The story of escalating executive pay over the last several decades is to some
extent a story of a shift in norms that now permit executives to receive pay that is
several hundred times that of ordinary workers. Agency problems have always existed
in the modern public corporation, but presumably social norms helped limit executive
pay prior to the 1990s. Properly crafted, an executive pay surtax might help reestablish norms of acceptable pay practices. At the least, careful attention to design
should mitigate concerns regarding gross ups.
*****
At the other end of the spectrum from excise taxes on golden parachute payments
are general personal income tax rate increases. An executive pay surtax seems to fall
somewhere in between, so before concluding this subsection it is worth considering
whether executives are able to shift the incidence of general tax rate increases onto
their employers. Eissa and Giertz suggest that one reason that executive income
elasticities might be lower than those of high income taxpayers generally might be that
executives are able to pass tax rate hikes on. 109 If executives do not bear the burden of
rate hikes, these executives would not have the same incentives to shift income or
otherwise avoid the tax. However, this story, while plausible, would presumably only
work in one direction. Managers with power over their own pay would demand to be
grossed up for tax hikes, but would not be inclined to pass on the benefit of cuts in
their tax rates. Thus, the managerial power view suggests that executive elasticities
would be low with respect to tax increases that are passed on, but would be significant
with respect to rate cuts, which would be retained by the executives. There is no
evidence, however, that the Reagan or Bush era tax cuts resulted in significant,
positive elasticities for executives,110 and no evidence of which I am aware that
executives pass on general rate increases to their employers.
In sum, while we certainly cannot dismiss the possibility that executives would be
able to shift the incidence of an executive pay surtax onto employers, the surtax seems
quite different than the executive-level taxes that have been fully grossed up in the
past. Moreover, a properly designed surtax should not loosen the outrage constraint on
executive pay and provide scope for pay increases that would compensate for the
surtax. Finally, even in cases in which executive level taxes have been fully grossed
up, the response was not immediate. To the extent that firms increased compensation
to offset all or a portion of an executive pay surtax, the increases would likely be
gradual, ensuring that current executives would bear a real reduction in after-tax pay.
b. The Economic Impact of Surtax Gross Ups
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Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 27.
Hall and Liebman included the 1981 and 1986 marginal tax rate reductions in their analysis and
found non-transitory elasticities that were very small or negative. Hall & Liebman, supra note X
[Executive Compensation], at 39-41. Eissa and Giertz examined the 2001 rate reductions and found
negative elasticity. Eissa & Giertz, supra note X, at 3.
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Taken in isolation, the imposition of a surtax on excessive executive pay that was
partially grossed up would have two effects. Executive after-tax compensation would
be reduced somewhat, but the existing distortions in corporate investment would be
exacerbated. If executives were able to fully shift the incidence of a surtax onto their
employers, the surtax would not reduce after-tax pay, but would more greatly
exacerbate investment distortions. If one thinks that surtax gross ups would be
complete and immediate, a surtax is simply a bad idea. However, if one believes that
gross ups are likely to be partial, at most, and to occur gradually, if at all, one may
favor the imposition of a surtax, particularly once one realizes that refunding the
proceeds of a surtax to investors can ensure that distortions in corporate investment
decisions will not be exacerbated by the imposition of a surtax, even in the case of a
full gross up. Moreover, assuming that surtax proceeds are refunded to investors, the
impact of a partial gross up on executive after-tax income (and investment decisions)
could be offset by increasing the surtax rate. Investor tax relief is taken up in earnest
in Part IV. It should be apparent from the discussion in this subsection, however, that
ensuring that the imposition of a surtax would not exacerbate investment distortions
provides a compelling rationale for linking investor tax relief to the adoption of a
surtax.
Imagine a surtax imposed at a 10% rate on executive pay in excess of $1 million
per year. Suppose a CEO’s total compensation for the year was expected to be $2
million, generating a surtax of $100,000. Absent any gross up, the surtax would
reduce the executive’s after-tax compensation by $100,000, and $100,000 would be
available for investor tax relief or other purposes.
Now imagine that executives are fully grossed up for a surtax. Assuming a 35%
marginal rate of tax on ordinary income, a full gross up would require additional pay
of $182,000. 111 This pay increment would cover the $118,000 surtax on the entire
grossed up amount of $2.182 million and the additional $64,000 tax at ordinary
income rates on the gross up. At a 35% marginal corporate rate, the after-tax cost to
the firm of supplying this gross up would be $118,000. 112 Note that this after-tax cost
is exactly the same as the surtax collected from the executive. In aggregate, refunding
the surtax to investors would just keep them whole as long as corporate marginal tax
rates and executive marginal rates (excluding the surtax) were the same. 113 Moreover,
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The formula for determining the gross up amount (GUA) is as follows.
GUA = (surtax rate * pay in excess of surtax threshold) / (1 – surtax rate – exec MTR on ordinary inc.).
112
Assuming repeal of I.R.C. § 162(m), there would be no question as to the full deductibility of the
gross-up of the surtax. If I.R.C. § 162(m) were to be retained, the gross-up would need to be provided
in the form of performance-based pay to ensure deductibility. But doing so would not be difficult. A
firm could simply increase the number of shares underlying an option grant to provide a fully deductible
gross up under I.R.C. § 162(m).
113
To be more exact, refunding the surtax to investors keeps them whole with respect to a full gross up
as long as the firm’s corporate marginal tax rate equals or exceeds the executive’s marginal tax rate
(excluding the surtax).
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it is readily apparent that in the case of full gross ups, increasing the surtax rate would
do nothing more than increase the circular flow of funds. 114
Now suppose that executives are able to shift 50% of a surtax onto their
employers. Under the facts above, the gross up would be reduced from $182,000 to
$91,000. The overall effect in this scenario would be to reduce the executive’s aftertax compensation by $50,000 (relative to the no surtax, no gross up scenario) and,
assuming that all surtax proceeds are refunded to investors, increase net investor
returns by $50,000. 115
Finally, assume 50% shifting to employers but imagine that the surtax rate is
increased to 20%. The end result would be a $100,000 reduction in executive after-tax
compensation and, assuming full refunding, a net $100,000 benefit to investors, which,
in aggregate, matches the economics of a 10% surtax with no gross up. 116 To be clear,
in the case of partial gross ups, the desired reduction in after-tax executive pay can
generally be achieved by increasing the surtax rate, and refunding surtax proceeds to
investors ensures that distortions in investment decisions resulting from extraction of
excessive pay will be mitigated, not worsened. The two cases, are not identical,
however. Nominal compensation in the 10% surtax, no gross up scenario remains at
$2 million. Nominal compensation in the 20% surtax, 50% gross up scenario
increases to $2.22 million. The implications of this difference for the design of
investor tax relief are taken up in Part IV.
3. The Creation of an Executive Pay Target or Focal Point
Experience with § 162(m) suggests that the creation of an executive pay threshold
for the purpose of imposing a surtax or a prohibition would have the unintended
consequence of serving as an invitation to firms paying less than the threshold to
increase pay levels. This is a drawback, but a fairly minor one. As we will see in Part
V, the pernicious effect of unintentionally setting a pay target would be much greater
in the case of coercive regulation because, in order to limit the inefficiency associated
with one-size-fits-all compulsory regulation, caps on pay would almost certainly be set
at a much higher level than thresholds for applying a surtax.
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Suppose, for example, that the surtax was increased to 20% of pay in excess of $1 million per year
and that the executive is fully grossed up so as to receive after gross up salary of $2 million. The gross
up amount would be $444,444. The surtax collected would be $288,889. Incremental ordinary income
tax collected would be $155,555. The employer’s after-tax cost of funding the gross up would be
$288,889.
115
In other words, the surtax collected and made available for investor tax relief ($109,000) would
exceed the after tax cost of providing the gross up ($59,000, at a 35% marginal rate) by $50,000.
116
Under the same assumptions as before, increasing the surtax rate to 20% implies a full gross up
amount of $444,444 and a 50% gross up amount of $222,222. With pre-tax compensation of
$2,222,222 the executive would face a compensation surtax of $244,444 (20% of $1,222,222) and
additional tax at ordinary income rates of $77,777 (35% of $222k) yielding total incremental taxes of
$322,222. Given the $222,222 pre-tax gross up amount, the executive would be down $100,000 after
tax. The firm’s after-tax cost of supplying the gross up would be $144,444 (65% of $222,222), which is
$100,000 less than the surtax collected from the executive.
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As noted above, § 162(m) limits corporate tax deductions for non-performance
based senior executive pay to $1 million per executive per year. Section 162(m) was
not designed to produce revenue. It was intended to redirect compensation into stock
options and other forms of performance based pay, which remain fully deductible. In
1992 when § 162(m) was enacted, $1 million per year was at the high end of the CEO
salary range. Section 162(m) did have the desired effect of shifting pay into
performance based channels, but it also acted as a focal point or target, as much as it
did as a cap, on non-performance based pay. Following the enactment of § 162(m),
CEOs who received salaries below $1 million per year tended to receive larger pay
increases, and CEOs whose pay was furthest below $1 million per year tended to
receive the largest pay increases.117 It appears that companies read § 162(m) as
endorsement of CEO salaries up to $1 million per year.
I will argue in Part V that the focal point problem is less pernicious in the case of a
surtax than a pay cap. Nonetheless, the focal point concern would provide an
argument for adopting a relatively low initial threshold for applying a surtax and
gradually increasing the rate at higher levels of income.
4. Avoidance and Other Responses
Subsection 2, above, considered who, between firms and executives, would bear
the burden of a surtax on executive pay. However that tension is resolved, firms and
executives working together would have an incentive to avoid the surtax altogether if
they could. This section considers possible avoidance strategies ranging from changes
in compensation design or increased use of deferred compensation to shifts in
organizational form. This section also briefly considers the potential impact of a
surtax on after-tax incentives and on ex ante employment decisions.
a. Compensation
Perspective

Design

from

a

“Global”

Contracting

Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson popularized a way of thinking about tax
planning for executive pay that they called a global contracting approach. 118 Their
quite sensible idea was that employers and executives should select compensation
instruments that minimize the combined tax burden and share the tax savings.
However, they also recognized that compensation decisions entail non-tax costs and
benefits, such as the creation of desirable incentives, that must be taken into account in
compensation planning.
This subsection applies this global tax perspective in considering whether the
impact of a surtax could be avoided in full or in part by issuing incentive stock options
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See David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting Cost
Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997 (2002).
118
MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH (3d ed. 2005).
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(ISOs) in lieu of nonqualified stock options (NQSOs), by increasing the use of equity
compensation or deferred compensation generally, or by channeling compensation into
non-taxed perks. The short answers are no, no, and perhaps yes, but only to a limited
extent. 119
i. ISOs versus NQSOs
From a global contracting perspective, the most obvious compensation adjustment
to consider in response to the imposition of a surtax on ordinary compensation income
would be a switch from non-qualified stock options to incentive stock options.120
ISOs become increasingly tax advantaged as the rate of tax on executive ordinary
income increases, and the incentive properties of the two types of options are
essentially identical. Under current tax laws, however, the scope to shift from NQSOs
to ISOs would be very limited. If limits on the size of ISO awards were raised,
avoidance could be curtailed by applying the compensation surtax to ISO gains at
exercise.
To unpack this, we must begin with a brief summary of the tax treatment of ISOs
and NQSOs. The difference between the market price of the underlying stock and an
NQSO’s exercise price is included in the ordinary income of the optionee at exercise,
and the employer that granted the option is entitled to a deduction in the same amount
and in the same period for compensation paid. Going forward, the employee holds the
underlying stock as a capital asset with basis equal to the market value of the stock at
exercise.
If holding period and other requirements are satisfied, ISOs are not taxed until the
underlying stock is sold, and the optionee is taxed at capital gains rates on the entire
gain on the option. 121 For the optionee, ISO treatment converts ordinary income into
capital gain and permits deferral of tax beyond the point of exercise. 122 However, the
issuing firm pays a price in that no compensation deduction is allowed with respect to
options taxed as ISOs. As these descriptions suggest, the relative tax advantage of
ISOs versus NQSOs depends on the rate of tax on employee ordinary income,
employee capital gains, and corporate income. All else being equal, ISOs become
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Readers who have a limited appetite for detailed analyses of the tax treatment of equity pay may
wish to take my word with respect to the first two propositions and skip ahead to subsection (4)(a)(iii),
which considers increased use of non-taxed perks.
120
I use the term “ordinary compensation income” to reflect the idea that a surtax would apply to an
executive’s compensation income reported on Form W-2 that is today taxed as ordinary income. The
surtax would not apply to other sources of ordinary income such as interest income. In addition, the
surtax would not apply to all income from services, such as gains on founders’ stock (see Victor
Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)) or (at least as a first pass) gains
on ISOs taxed as capital gain.
121
I.R.C §§ 421(a), 422(a) (2006). In order to qualify for ISO tax treatment, shares underlying ISO
must be held for at least two years following the grant of the option and at least one year following
option exercise.
122
Deferral is only advantageous in this situation if option expiration is approaching and the employee
has a non-tax reason for holding the underlying shares beyond exercise.
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more attractive as the rate of tax applied to employee ordinary compensation income
increases.
At current top marginal tax rates for executives and corporations, non-qualified
options are preferred over ISOs from a global contracting perspective. 123 However, if
a 10% surtax were to be applied to executive compensation income, including gains
from the exercise of non-qualified options, high marginal rate firms and executives
would be roughly indifferent between the two types of options. 124 At a 15% surtax,
ISOs would clearly be tax preferred. 125
Given the ability to carryover losses from previous years, 126 many corporations
face effective tax rates that are less than the 35% nominal effective rate, and another
way to look at the ISO/NQSO tradeoff is in terms of the breakeven corporate tax rate.
At current top marginal individual rates, non-qualified options remain tax preferred
until the effective corporate rate falls below 24%. 127 With a 10% surtax, ISOs would
be taxed preferred at any firm facing an effective marginal rate of 35% or less. 128 In
sum, the imposition of a surtax on executive compensation income would make ISOs
relatively more attractive and, in fact, tax preferred at many firms. Put another way, to
the extent that executives and firms could shift from the use of non-qualified options
to ISOs, they would be able to partially avoid the impact of the surtax in many
situations.
Of course, if one thought there was a significant risk that the economic impact of a
compensation surtax could be avoided by shifting pay into ISOs, one solution would
be to apply the surtax to all options – ISO or NQSO – at the time of exercise. Doing
so would not be administratively burdensome as the paper gains on ISOs at exercise
are already treated as an adjustment in computing the Alternative Minimum Tax. 129
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SCHOLES ET AL., supra note X, at 230. Non-qualified options are preferred from a global tax
perspective when the corporate tax rate is greater than the ratio of the tax rate on the optionee’s ordinary
compensation income minus the effective tax rate on the optionee’s capital gains over one minus the
effective capital gains rate. The effective capital gains rate reflects the deferral beyond exercise of
taxation on ISO gains. In the calculations that follow, I have assumed a nominal executive capital gains
rate of 15% and deferral for one year at an after-tax rate of 5%, yielding an effective capital gains rate of
14.3%. At a 35% marginal rate on ordinary compensation income, the breakeven corporate tax rate is
24%. Thus, NQSOs are jointly preferred for firms facing effective marginal rates equal to the 35% top
stated rate.
124
Increasing the marginal rate on ordinary compensation income from 35% to 45% increases the
breakeven corporate marginal rate to 36%, slightly higher than the stated rate. If one assumes that ISOs
provide no deferral benefit, such that the effective capital gains rate is equal to the nominal rate, the
breakeven corporate rate in this scenario is 35%.
125
At a 50% marginal rate on ordinary compensation income, the breakeven corporate marginal rate is
42%.
126
See I.R.C § 172 (2006) (permitting losses to be carried back two years and forward twenty years).
127
See supra note x.
128
See supra note x.
129
Applying the surtax to ISO gains at exercise might be thought to be particularly unfair or
burdensome in that executives are required to retain shares underlying ISOs for at least one year
following exercise in order to qualify for preferential tax rates, I.R.C. § 422(a) (2006), but observers
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It is not clear, however, that we would need to apply the surtax to ISO exercise
because the capacity of firms to issue ISOs to senior executives is extremely limited.
The ISO provision of the Code includes a non-inflation adjusted annual limit on ISO
grants of $100,000 per recipient. 130 The limit applies to the aggregate fair market
value of stock subject to ISOs that first becomes exercisable in a given year, and the
dollar limit is based on the market value of the stock subject to the option on the date
of grant. Purported ISO shares in excess of this limit are treated as NQSO shares.
Compensatory options are almost always granted at the money, that is, with an
exercise price equal to the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of
grant. 131 Under a reasonable range of assumptions, the per share value of an at-themoney option on the stock of a large public company would be somewhere between
30% and 50% of the share price. 132 As a result, the value of an option on shares worth
$100,000 would be around $30,000 to $50,000. For a senior corporate executive
subject to a surtax on pay, the difference between ISO and NQSO tax treatment on a
chunk of compensation this small would be negligible.
If an executive pay surtax were to be adopted, executives and firms might lobby
for an increase in the limitation on ISOs. In such a case, it might make sense to
reconsider applying the surtax to ISOs at exercise. Absent an increase in the ISO
limitation, the scope for avoidance via ISO issuance seems trivial.
ii. Other Equity Based Pay and Deferred Compensation

may not be seriously concerned about cash flow issues faced by the population of executives who would
be subjected to the surtax.
More generally, the application of the AMT to ISO gains at exercise has long been problematic. In
cases in which ISO exercise produces a paper gain at exercise, but in which share prices drop before the
ISO holding period requirements are satisfied, it often turns out that the former holder has little or no
net gain on the ISO, but paid substantial AMT at exercise. Former ISO holders were entitled to a credit
for AMT paid on ISO exercise, but that credit could well exceed the tax due on the sale of the
underlying shares, creating what is known as the “ISO AMT Trap.” Young, relatively low paid tech
workers who received a substantial chunk of their compensation in ISOs and fell into the AMT trap
provided a fairly compelling case for relief, and Congress provided that relief in 2006. Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432 § 402, 120 Stat. 2922, 2953 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. §
53(e) (2006)) (allowing a refundable tax credit through 2012). However, the same degree of sympathy
may not extend to highly compensated executives who would be subject to a surtax.
130
I.R.C. § 422(d) (2006).
131
Today, at-the-money option design is ubiquitous because I.R.C. § 409A effectively bars grants of inthe-money options and employees excessively discount out-of-the-money options. David I. Walker, The
Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1505,
1508, 1549-50 (2009).
132
The value of an at-the-money option is primarily a function of the time to exercise and the volatility
of the stock. The figures provided in the text are based on a six year period to option exercise, stock
price volatility ranging from 25% to 50%, no dividends, and a 3% risk free rate.
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A surtax on executive pay would have little or no impact on the attractiveness from
a global contracting perspective of non-qualified deferred compensation or of equity
based compensation relative to non-equity pay. Thus, equity pay and deferred
compensation would not present a significant avoidance opportunity.
Of course, one would have to take some care in designing a surtax to guard against
avoidance through the use of tax advantaged deferred compensation. Under current
tax rules, executives can enter into non-qualified deferred compensation arrangements
with their employers that defer compensation, earnings on that compensation, and the
tax on both until the amounts are received at retirement or other termination from
employment. 133 From a global contracting perspective, non-qualified deferred
compensation tends to be preferable when an executive’s tax rate is likely to be lower
at payout than when the compensation is earned, when the employer’s tax rate is likely
to be higher at payout than when the compensation is earned, or when the employer
can invest at a higher after-tax rate than can the executive. 134
Suppose, for example, that a surtax was designed to apply to an executive’s W-2
compensation in a year. Amounts deferred through a non-qualified plan would not be
reported in the year earned and would not be subjected to the surtax. In this case, it
would be important to ensure that the deferred compensation was subjected to the
surtax when it was paid out. Otherwise, executives and firms could avoid the surtax
through non-qualified deferred compensation.
One might also think at first blush that increasing an executive’s effective marginal
tax rate by applying a surtax to compensation would encourage deferral by lowering
her after-tax investment returns, but a surtax would have no impact on the after-tax
savings rates available to an executive outside of a company plan. The surtax would
apply only to compensation received in the year. Outside of a company plan, an
executive would be taxed on her investment gains at the regular ordinary income rates
or capital gains rates that apply to all individual investors.
Assuming that employer and executive tax rates are not expected to change over
time and that non-qualified deferred compensation is attractive at a particular company
because the employer can obtain higher after-tax investment returns (perhaps because
losses from prior years result in a low effective marginal rate), placing a surtax on
executive compensation income would make deferred compensation somewhat less
attractive. The reason, in a nutshell, is that the executive-level tax benefit in this
scenario is equivalent to imposing tax on the amount deferred in the year earned and
exempting subsequent investment gains from tax. As the rate of tax on compensation
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Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV.
571, 577 (2007).
134
SCHOLES ET AL., supra note X, at 214. Note that employer tax deductions associated with nonqualified deferred compensation are deferred as well.
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income increases and the notional after-tax pool of funds diminishes, the benefit of
exempting returns on that amount falls as well. 135
The imposition of a relatively flat surtax on executive pay would seem to have
little impact on deferred compensation decisions. However, if a steeply graduated
surtax were to be adopted, it might be advisable to apply the surtax to all
compensation, deferred or non-deferred, earned by an executive within the year. In
such a case, an executive might anticipate being subjected to a lower surtax at
retirement and might increase deferred compensation for that reason. Note that the
imposition of a surtax on amounts deferred in the year earned would not prevent an
executive from enjoying the current benefits of deferral (if any) with respect to
ordinary tax rates. 136 To be sure, the added tax burden might discourage deferral at
the margin since an executive would have to come up with the funds to pay the surtax,
but the application of a modest surtax on compensation amounts deferred by very high
income individuals would not seem too burdensome. 137
As in the case of non-qualified deferred compensation, if tax rates are not expected
to change over time, the global tax advantage of NQSOs and restricted stock relative
to salary and bonus, for example, depends primarily on the after-tax investment rates
available to firms and executives. A surtax on executive pay would not affect after-tax
returns to executives on investments made with post-compensation dollars. Those
returns would continue to be taxed at ordinary marginal rates or capital gains rates.
On this dimension, a surtax would be irrelevant.
As in the case of deferred compensation, however, in cases in which equity
compensation is tax preferred, the extent of the preference does depend on the rate of
tax applied to an executive’s compensation income, and, as before, placing a surtax on
executive compensation income would tend to somewhat reduce the attractiveness of
equity compensation. 138
Companies, however, also care about the incentive properties of various
compensation instruments, and the strength of executive incentives depends on after-
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See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 YALE L.J.
506 (1986).
136
At current tax rates, a global tax benefit arises primarily when employers are able to invest at a low
after-tax rate because they have a low effective marginal rate due to accumulated NOLs or invest in
their own stock on a tax exempt basis per I.R.C. § 1032 (2006). See Halperin, supra note x [Yale L.J.],
at 540.
137
Academic commentators generally conclude that under current tax rules non-qualified deferred
compensation can provide tax savings to the high income individuals that participate in them and their
employers. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note X [Yale L.J.]; Daniel Halperin, 2009 Erwin N. Griswold
Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Rethinking the Advantage of Tax Deferral, 62
TAX LAW. 535 (2009); Yale & Polsky, supra note X. As such, moves that marginally discourage the
use of these plans would not seem unwelcome.
138
This analysis, based on the global contracting approach of Scholes and Wolfson, ignores the impact
of tax rates on the incentives generated by stock and option compensation. Incentive effects are added
to the picture in subsection b below.
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tax, not pre-tax outcomes. An increase in personal tax rates, or, in this case, the
adoption of an executive pay surtax, reduces after-tax incentives created by stock and
options (or other forms of incentive compensation). In this respect, one can draw an
analogy between taxes and insurance. An increase in marginal rates reduces after tax
returns on incentive pay when outcomes are positive and cushions the negative effects
when outcomes are negative. As marginal rates increase, an employer would have to
increase pre-tax incentives in order to maintain the desired level of after-tax
incentives. Peter Katuscak has theorized that in the case of risk and effort averse
executives, it would be optimal for firms to offset the effect of an increase in marginal
employee tax rates to some extent by increasing pre-tax incentives. 139 Under
Katuscak’s model, however, after firms adjust, the net result of the imposition of an
executive pay surtax would still be a modest reduction in after-tax incentives. 140
Finally, in discussing non-qualified deferred compensation, I suggested that,
despite the lack of impact on relative after-tax investment rates, we still might want to
apply the surtax in the year that deferred pay is earned. The reason is that if a
graduated surtax were to be adopted, a covered executive might expect to be in a lower
effective marginal rate (regular ordinary rate plus surtax) at retirement than in the year
in which pay is earned. An expectation of decreasing marginal tax rates encourages
deferral. Of course, restricted stock and NQSOs also result in deferral of income, but
the period of deferral generally is quite short. Restricted stock typically vests and
becomes taxable between one and five years following grant. 141 Options typically are
exercised within six years of grant. 142 Given this relatively short timeframe, it seems
perfectly reasonable (as well as being administratively convenient) to apply the surtax
to NQSO gains at exercise and to restricted stock at vesting consistent with the timing
of the taxation of these instruments as ordinary compensation income.
iii. Non-Taxed Perquisites
The imposition of a surtax on executive pay would increase the attractiveness of
non-taxed perquisites relative to conventional taxed compensation. However, my
intuition is that the scope to pay executives in perks is fairly limited and that a modest
surtax would not result in very much avoidance of this type.
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Peter Katuscak, The Impact of Personal Income Taxation on Executive Compensation (May 8, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649851).
140
Id.
141
FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2009 TOP 250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR
EXECUTIVES 13 (2009), http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/2009_Top-250-Report.pdf.
142
See J. Carr Bettis et al., Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Effects of Employee Stock
Options, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 446, 447 (2005) (finding for a sample of 140,000 option exercises by
executives at almost 4000 firms between 1996 and 2002 that, on average, options were exercised a little
over two years following vesting and more than four years prior to expiration); Jennifer N. Carpenter,
The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock Options, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 138 (1998) (finding for a
sample of forty firms (mainly large manufacturers) that executive stock options granted between 1983
and 1984 were, on average, exercised after 5.8 years).
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Suppose, for example, that, in response to the imposition of a surtax, a company
purchases a house for $10 million that it allows its CEO and her family to live in rent
free. Suppose the fair market rental value of the property would be $500,000 per year.
If the rental value of this home is excludable, the surtax (as well an individual income
taxes generally) could be avoided on $500,000 per year in compensation. 143 In order
for company provided housing to be excludable from income, the housing must be
provided for the convenience of the employer, must be on the business premises, and
must be provided and accepted as a condition of employment. 144 Each requirement is
something of a term of art in tax law, and one can find examples of the exclusion
being upheld in situations that stretch the common sense meanings of business
premises and convenience of the employer. 145
Combined business and personal travel might provide another example. Aside
from the 50% limitation on the deductibility of meals, 146 business travel is deductible
by the employer and results in no tax consequences for the executive. Following the
imposition of a surtax, one would think that “business” travel to attractive destinations
would become somewhat more attractive, representing a shift in compensation to this
non-taxed perk.
Nonetheless, I would not anticipate a great deal of compensation being redirected
in this fashion following the imposition of a surtax. The shift into employer owned
housing would seem to be the most significant threat, and even here the ability and
willingness of firms and executives to redirect compensation would be limited for at
least four reasons. First, there is the difficulty of qualifying for the exclusion under the
tax rules and regulations. 147 Second, public companies must now disclose in the
executive compensation discussion section of their annual proxy statements all
substantial perks (taxed or untaxed) delivered to their top executives. 148 Public
company executive compensation packages are now subject to a separate shareholder
vote that is non-binding, but quite embarrassing to lose. And excessive perks appear
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The employer would be entitled to deduct its expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of
this business property. I.R.C. § 162.
144
I.R.C. § 119(a) (2006).
145
See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 585 F.2d 1060 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (holding that housing located in a
prestigious Tokyo location and provided to the president of a Japanese subsidiary of a U.S. company
was on the business premises because the house was associated with the company and was used
regularly for business entertaining).
146
I.R.C. § 274(n) (2006).
147
I.R.C. § 119(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b).
148
SEC Release No. 33-8732A (2006). The SEC now requires proxy statement identification and
valuation of any perk that is valued at the greater of $25,000 or ten percent of total perk value. The SEC
has declined to define “perquisite” for disclosure purposes, but has noted that an item need not be
disclosed if it is “integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties.”
Otherwise, any item conferring a personal benefit constitutes a perk for these purposes. Moreover, the
SEC has stressed that the fact that an item might be provided for the convenience of the employer and
non-taxable for the executive is not relevant in determining whether an item must be disclosed. Finally,
executive housing is specifically listed in the SEC release as an example of an item that must be
disclosed as a perk. Id.
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to be a huge red flag for proxy advisory firms making recommendations on
shareholder “say on pay” votes. Third, aside from a (relatively) modest base salary,
most executive compensation is incentive pay of one form or another, and redirecting
that compensation into perks would diminish the incentives the board is attempting to
create. Fourth, a modest surtax would not result in excessively high marginal rates,
and would not increase the driving force to shift compensation into non-taxed perks to
a very significant extent. 149
In addition, of course, the imposition of a surtax on executive pay would increase
the attractiveness of other “working condition” fringe benefits, 150 such as fancy office
chairs, but this is trivial. A surtax would also provide a stronger incentive for firms to
provide executives with non-taxed health 151 or life insurance 152 coverage, but the
statutory exclusion for fringe benefits of this type is extremely limited, and so called
“split dollar” life insurance arrangements that formerly provided an end-run around the
statutory limitation on that benefit have been sharply curtailed. 153
b. Organizational Form
At the margin, imposing a surtax on executive pay could impact choices regarding
organizational form, such as the public/private decision or the decision to organize as a
subchapter C corporation or as a pass-through entity. The result is a series of line
drawing problems. For example, should the surtax be limited to public company
executives, or be extended to cover executives of private firms?
Obviously, limiting a surtax to the compensation received by public company
executives would increase the incentive for public companies to go private and for
private companies to shun public offerings. One might think that a modest surtax
placed on the compensation received by a handful of senior executives would not
affect the public/private calculus in any meaningful way, but a surtax limited to public
149

Contrast the imposition of a hard cap on executive pay. If a cap did not apply to corporate owned
executive housing or to personal travel disguised as business travel, one would expect significant
increases in these activities following the imposition of a cap. See infra note X and accompanying text.
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I.R.C. § 132(a)(3)&(d) (2006).
151
I.R.C. § 106 (2006) (exclusion of health or accident insurance provided by employer).
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I.R.C. § 79 (2006) (exclusion of $50,000 of group-term life insurance provided by employer).
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In a split dollar life insurance arrangement, an employer and an executive joined in the purchase of a
“whole life” life insurance policy covering the executive. (A “whole life” policy includes an investment
element in addition to “term” insurance coverage.) Typically, the employer paid some or all of the
premiums and was entitled to recover the premiums paid from policy proceeds. The executive received
current life insurance coverage and was entitled to policy proceeds in excess of employer contributions.
The tax issue was how to value the benefits conferred on executives through the employer contributions.
Prior to 2002, the IRS took the position that an executive was required to pay or recognize as income
only the “term cost” of the life insurance, which was typically well below the actual value transferred
from employer to employee. The additional value transferred was not deductible by the employer, but
to the extent that the executive’s marginal rate exceeded the firm’s marginal rate, this arrangement was
attractive from a global contracting perspective. In 2001 and 2002, the IRS issued notices that
eliminated the tax advantage of split dollar insurance arrangements. See Stewart Reifier, New IRS Rules
for Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, CORP. BUS. TAX’N MONTHLY, May 2003, at 20, 21-27.
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company executives would add to a growing list of burdens of being a public
company, including the increased compliance costs associated with the SarbanesOxley Act, 154 and for some firms could represent the proverbial straw that breaks the
camel’s back. There are still good reasons for going public, such as providing
liquidity to employee stockholders, 155 but it is becoming more clear over time that
diversified public shareholders are not necessarily needed as the ultimate enterprise
risk bearers. 156
The cleanest way to eliminate the incentive to go or stay private would be to
extend the surtax to include private company executives, and, to the extent that the
private company executive labor market is “infected” by excesses in the public
company market, such an extension could well be justified. But doing so would not
eliminate the line drawing problem, it would simply shift it.
Private company executives represent a significant fraction of very high income
taxpayers. Bakija, Cole, and Heim estimated that in 2005 there were more private
company executives earning more than $1 million per year than public company
executives. 157 Bakija, Cole, and Heim did not have information on organizational
form, but private companies would have consisted primarily of closely held businesses
organized as C corporations, S corporations, or LLCs. Some of these businesses
would have been portfolio companies held by private equity funds; others would have
been independent stand alone business ventures.
Given a lack of dispersed ownership, executive pay arrangements at these private
companies are more likely to be at arm’s length than are public company pay
arrangements. In cases in which there is a close identity of ownership and
management, pay levels are essentially irrelevant. 158 At portfolio companies and
similar firms where managers and owners are not identical, we would expect private
equity owners or their counterparts to bargain vigorously over executive pay. As
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See Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 116 (2007) (finding an increased frequency of going private transactions in the wake of the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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Even this benefit of going public is being eroded as markets develop in shares of closely held firms.
The SEC is currently examining the proper role and the proper regulation of these markets. See, e.g.,
Peter Lattman, Stock Trading in Private Companies Draws S.E.C. Scrutiny, DEALBOOK, Dec. 27, 2010,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/stock-trading-in-private-companies-draws-scrutiny; Julianne
Pepitone, SEC Casts Wide Net in Private Stock Trading Probe, CNNMONEY, Feb. 28, 2011,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/27/technology/secondary_market/index.htm; Julianne Pepitone, SEC
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CNNMONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/08/technology/SEC_shareholder_limit/index.htm.
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Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs,
and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008)
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Bakija et al, supra note X, at 51 tbl.3.
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At the extreme, consider a situation in which a firm has a sole shareholder who is also the company’s
CEO. Taxes aside, whether the owner takes her profits in the form of compensation or dividends is
irrelevant. There is no agency problem in this case because there is no separation of ownership and
control.
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noted above, however, to the extent that private companies compete with public
companies for executive talent, private company pay negotiators would have to
recognize and compensate for rent that could be extracted by executives at public
firms. In other words, despite the existence of arm’s length bargaining, executives of
private companies may benefit from the lack of effective bargaining at public
companies. If so, this phenomenon would provide a justification for expanding the
reach of an executive pay surtax to encompass private company executives. 159
But placing a surtax on private company executives would likely create distortions.
Public companies can go private, but they are unlikely to remain public and become
pass-through entities. Some private companies that are currently organized (or as a
startup potentially would organize) as C corporations and compensate their executives
with salary, bonus, and equity compensation might respond to a surtax on executive
pay by adopting a pass-through structure that provides compensation in the form of
partnership profits. 160
Theoretically, a surtax could be designed to reach
compensation in this form, but then the designer would have to struggle with
distinguishing labor income from investment income. 161 That, perhaps, would be a
bridge too far.
So there is a tension. On the one hand, extending the reach of a surtax to include
private company executive pay would respond to the inflation of pay levels in this
market that results from excess pay in the public company market and would avoid
creating a new incentive for public companies to go private. On the other hand,
extending the surtax to private companies would encourage those companies to
restructure so as to avoid the surtax on compensation. Perhaps a compromise that
would balance these competing concerns would be in order. The surtax might be
extended to cover private firm executive pay, but at lower rates – perhaps 50% of the
rate that applies to public company executive pay.
c. Career Decisions
Although economists generally agree that short and medium-term labor supply
elasticity for high income primary earners is quite low, 162 a surtax applied to executive
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At first blush, one might think that applying a surtax to public company executive pay could be
costly for private companies to the extent that public company executives are able to negotiate higher
pay levels to compensate for the tax. But this is not necessarily the case. If we assume that private
companies negotiate effectively at arm’s length but are essentially price takers, they would only need to
keep executive candidates whole on an after-tax basis.
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See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 93-96 (2008) (describing Blackstone’s
issuance of common units in a publicly traded partnership that enabled Blackstone’s founders to
continue to receive their returns in the form of carried interest taxed at capital gains rates). Placing a
surtax on private company executive pay would also exacerbate the problem identified by Fleischer in
Taxing Founders’ Stock, supra note X, by encouraging founders to take their labor earnings in the form
of share price appreciation.
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Cf. Fleischer, supra note X [Founders’ Stock].
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See supra notes X(87-99) and accompanying text.
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pay could affect the career decisions of talented individuals. Directionally, imposing a
surtax on executive pay should discourage entry into the executive labor market.
However, this distortion in the executive labor market should be seen as offsetting
a distortion that currently exists and thus as a positive, efficiency-enhancing aspect of
a surtax approach. One implication of this Article’s premise that executive
compensation is inflated systematically as a result of deficiencies in the compensationsetting process is that the number of candidates seeking these positions would be
inflated as well. To this extent, an executive pay surtax can be seen as a corrective tax
that seeks to reduce distortions that follow from market failure.

IV. A TAX RESPONSE TO THE EXECUTIVE PAY PROBLEM: INVESTOR TAX RELIEF

The second element of the proposal is investor tax relief, which is designed to
mitigate the inefficient distortion of investment that follows from the extraction by
executives of excessive compensation. This Part expands on the rationale for investor
tax relief and discusses factors that should be considered in designing such relief.
A. Why Investor Tax Relief?
As discussed in Part I, the extraction of excessive compensation by U.S. executives
reduces shareholder returns and discourages investment in the corporate sector. The
primary idea behind channeling the proceeds of an executive pay surtax into investor
tax relief is to offset the distortionary effects of excessive compensation on
investment. If we think of excessive executive pay as being an economic tax on
investment, reducing actual investment taxes should mitigate the adverse effect.
Investor tax relief need not necessarily be tied to the imposition of a surtax. Either
project could be pursued independently. 163 However, two considerations suggest that
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Generally, it is a mistake to think of revenues from Pigovian taxes as being “free” money that is
available to be directed to noble causes. For example, environmental taxes may cause actors to
internalize external costs, which is move in the direction of efficiency, but these taxes do make
participants worse off. See, e.g., James A. Mirrlees, Global Public Economics, in NEW SOURCES OF
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 200 (A.B. Atkinson ed., 2004). As a result, their revenues should not
necessarily be directed towards “green” initiatives, if those initiatives would not have been pursued
absent the environmental tax. However, the present case is somewhat different. To the extent that an
executive pay surtax simply extracts a portion of the rents received by executives, no one else is made
worse off by the imposition of the tax.
Of course, this does not mean that the revenue should be frittered away. Any potential use of the
revenue must compete with a reduction in other taxes that distort behavior, such as existing income
taxes. There is already a great deal of support for the idea of reducing corporate income tax rates in
order to reduce distortions and enhance competitiveness, and one could view the imposition of an
executive pay surtax as an offset to a general corporate tax rate reduction. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ADVISORY BOARD, THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION,
COMPLIANCE,
AND
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TAXATION
65
(Aug.
2010),
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linking the two might be advantageous. First, as discussed in Part III, surtaxes might
be partially offset by increases in executive pay. To the extent that this occurs, the
surtax would actually increase the drag on domestic corporate investment. Refunding
the surtax to investors would ensure that distortions in investment were not worsened
by the imposition of a surtax. If a surtax were to be fully refunded to investors,
investors could be no worse off, in aggregate, as a result of the imposition of the
surtax. In all likelihood, a surtax would be at most partially passed on to employers,
and investor tax relief would both cover the greater compensation expense arising
from the surtax gross up and mitigate the effect of excessive executive compensation
as it currently exists.
Second, a revenue neutral combination of a surtax and investor tax relief might be
more politically palatable than either element alone. Adding investor tax relief to the
imposition of a surtax would defuse arguments that the surtax proposal is anti-business
and might overcome the resistance of those opposed to tax increases generally.
Adding the surtax to investor tax relief would provide a funding mechanism and
deflate the opposition of deficit hawks. 164
One might object that returning surtax proceeds to investors, a wealthy class on
average, is taking money from the super rich and giving it to the merely rich, which is
an odd way of combating the effect of excessive executive pay on income inequality.
But the greatest growth in income inequality in the U.S. has been at the very highest
end. It lies in the top 0.1% of earners increasing their share of national income from
2% to 8% over the last thirty years, and executives are more concentrated in that class
than investors generally. 165 Moreover, to the extent that excessive executive pay
burdens labor through a shift away from public company investment, mitigating that
investment distortion through investor tax relief would benefit labor indirectly.
B. Investor Tax Relief Design Issues
Investor tax relief could take one of several forms. Relief could be granted in the
form of a reduction in the corporate income tax rate, or relief could be provided at the
investor level, through a reduction in taxes on dividends or capital gains. Relief could
be general or firm-specific, ranging from a refundable corporate tax credit equal to the
surtax collected from the executives at a particular company to a general reduction in
the tax rate on qualified dividends. This section discusses the factors that one would
consider in designing investor tax relief to respond to the problems created by

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf (noting that
reduction in effective corporate tax rates would result in significant revenue losses absent efforts to
broaden the tax base).
164
Cf., Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. REG. 1 (2010) (suggesting that a stabilizing
surcharge on the price of oil be refunded to consumers in order to, inter alia, reduce political
opposition).
165
See supra note x and accompanying text.
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excessive executive pay. On balance, I conclude that corporate tax relief is the more
promising approach, but that the arguments for firm-specific versus general corporate
tax relief are about even.
1. Matching the Effect and Incidence of Pay Excesses
While shareholders bear the cost of excessive executive pay in the first instance, as
discussed in Part II, the long-run incidence is less clear. It also seems obvious that
extraction of excess compensation discourages investment in the corporate sector, but
the degree to which this occurs and where the capital flows instead is not fully clear.
Ideally, investor tax relief would be matching in incidence and would reverse the
distortions created by excessive executive pay.
Part II suggested that from an incidence perspective, the effect of excessive
executive pay may be similar to that of a corporate level income tax. If that is right, it
would make sense to provide investor relief in the form of corporate income tax relief.
We may not know exactly what fractions of incremental corporate taxes and excessive
executive pay are borne by shareholders, non-corporate capital, and labor, but the
fractions should be the same in the two cases. Thus, if it is true that domestic labor
ultimately bears the lion’s share of the burden of incremental taxes and excess
executive pay, corporate tax relief should flow through to labor, as well. However
capital allocations are distorted by the economic tax of excessive pay, those distortions
should be mitigated by a reduction in corporate income taxes.
Of course, a general reduction in corporate tax rates would not mitigate the effects
of excessive executive pay at companies that are effectively tax exempt because of
large accumulated losses. 166 And there is no reason to think that these firms would be
immune from the effects of failure in the executive labor market. Thus, to the extent
that shareholders of a firm with a large loss position bear the cost of excessive
executive pay, a general corporate tax rate reduction would provide little benefit.
Firm-specific tax relief, e.g., a refundable corporate tax credit, would benefit
shareholders in this instance. For two reasons, however, this factor may not weigh
greatly in favor of firm-specific relief. First, for diversified shareholders the difference
between firm-specific and general corporate tax relief would be minimal. Second, to
the extent that the cost of excessive executive pay is passed on to non-corporate capital
or labor through a shift in equilibrium investing, again general corporate tax relief
should suffice.
The effect of shareholder level tax relief, i.e., dividend tax relief, may also flow
through to the factors of production that bear the cost of excessive executive pay, but
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Under U.S. tax laws, companies that generate losses are not entitled to receive money back from the
government, but these companies are permitted to carry these losses – termed net operating losses or
NOLs – backward and/or forward in time to offset taxable profits. I.R.C § 172 (2006). A company that
has a large accumulated NOL position may have a low likelihood of paying taxes for a considerable
number of years and thus a very low effective tax rate.
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this is somewhat less clear. Of course, even in the first instance, dividend tax relief
would respond to the investment inhibiting effect of excess executive pay in only a
very rough fashion. Assuming that dividend tax relief had no impact on dividend
practice, the relief would only benefit taxable individuals or entities investing in
dividend paying companies. Diversified taxable investors would see the benefit even
if some of their holdings failed to generate dividends, but diversification would not
help non-taxable investors in this respect.
2. Protection against Surtax Gross Ups
As discussed above, investor tax relief would be required to ensure that investment
distortions resulting from excessive executive pay were not exacerbated by
compensation gross ups in response to a surtax. Gross up protection also has
implications for the optimal design of investor tax relief. Firm-specific relief, e.g.,
providing a refundable corporate tax credit equal to the surtax collected from the
executives at a particular company, would be the safest way to ensure that investors
did not suffer from the imposition of a surtax. However, providing firm-specific relief
might encourage surtax gross ups if executives, boards, and investors more closely
identify refunded amounts with the surtax collected from the executives.
Consider the suggestion in Part III that surtax rates could be increased to account
for the likelihood of partial gross ups. It was noted that any desired reduction in aftertax executive pay generally could be achieved by increasing the surtax rate and that
refunding surtax proceeds to investors generally would ensure that distortions in
investment decisions resulting from extraction of excessive pay would be mitigated,
not worsened. 167 However, ramping up the surtax rate in the face of gross ups would
increase pre-tax executive pay and this difference in nominal compensation would
matter if investor tax relief were to be provided through a general reduction in
marginal corporate income tax rates or general dividend tax relief. The association
between the corporate cost of gross ups and investor tax relief would be quite loose,
and gross ups could result in winners and losers among investors. Reducing the
corporate tax rate would not benefit investors in effectively tax exempt firms, but these
investors would bear the cost of grossed up executive pay. Dividend tax relief would
not benefit non-taxable investors, whereas gross ups would come at the expense of
both taxable and non-taxable investors. As a result, increasing surtax levels to
mitigate shifting incidence of the surtax might be effective in aggregate, but might
disadvantage some investors relative to others.
Inconsistency between investors could be minimized by closely linking the surtax
to firm-specific tax relief. For example, firms could be given a refundable corporate
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the executive’s marginal tax rate (excluding the surtax). See supra note X and accompanying text.
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tax credit equal to the surtax collected from executives at that firm. This approach
would best ensure that investors were not harmed by the imposition of a surtax. 168
Providing firm-specific relief, however, might have the unintended consequence of
encouraging implicit gross ups if executives, boards, and perhaps even investors
closely identify the corporate tax relief with the surtax collected. For example, the
following two investor tax relief strategies might have different effects on executive,
board, and investor psychology, and thus on the outrage constraint. First, suppose that
the top corporate income tax rate for 2013 applicable to Acme Co. and all other U.S.
corporations is reduced from 35% to 34.8% as a result of aggregate surtax collections
in 2012. Suppose Acme’s tax bill is reduced by $5 million. Second, imagine that
Acme is entitled to a $5 million refundable tax credit for 2013 based on the collection
of $5 million in surtaxes from Acme executives in 2012. One can imagine that
Acme’s executives, directors, and investors might be more likely to view the firmspecific refundable credit as being the “executives’ money,” and thus would be more
amenable to compensating the executives up for the surtax in this scenario than they
would be in the face of an across the board corporate tax rate cut.
If so, this factor might offset the investor protective feature of firm-specific relief
to some degree. Whether general or specific, corporate income tax relief appears to be
superior to dividend tax relief when it comes to gross up protection. As discussed in
the previous subsection, dividend policies are heterogeneous, and many shareholders
might suffer the consequences of a surtax gross up but enjoy no relief from a reduced
rate of tax on their nonexistent dividends.
3. Salience and Persistence
If investor tax relief were to be provided through a general reduction in corporate
or shareholder level taxes, one might be concerned about whether the magnitude of a
surtax-commensurate rate cut would be salient and/or whether the “refund” would
disappear over time in the course of further negotiations over tax rates. This is
partially a question of the relative magnitude of excess executive pay, dividends, and
corporate income and partially a question of design.
Public company executive pay in excess of $1 million per executive is at least $20
billion annually. 169 Let us take this as a low end estimate of the tax base for a surtax.
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To be sure, this approach would not fully protect investors in firms with very low effective tax rates
if executives achieved complete surtax gross ups. Although the company would be entitled to a refund
of the surtax paid, the gross up would also reimburse the executive for tax at ordinary income rates on
the gross up amount. A firm with a low effective tax rate would see little tax benefit from making this
payment, so there would be a net after-tax cost. Nonetheless, investors in a firm with a low effective tax
rate would fare much better in a regime of firm-specific refundable credits for surtaxes paid than in a
regime in which corporate tax rates were cut generally to offset surtax receipts.
Matching a corporate tax credit with individual firm surtax proceeds would be somewhat analogous to
the current matching of corporate deductions for compensation paid with employee inclusions. See
I.R.C. § 83(a)&(h) (2006).
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By comparison, qualified dividends reported on taxable returns in 2008 totaled $141
billion, 170 and taxable corporate income is about $1 trillion per year. 171
Assuming no change in behavior and simply to provide a ballpark estimate of
orders of magnitude, a 10% surtax applied to executive pay in excess of $1 million per
executive per year would generate about $2 billion. This amount is roughly
comparable to a one percentage point reduction in the tax rate on qualified dividends,
which would cost the Treasury about $1.4 billion. But $2 billion in surtax receipts
would fund only about a 0.2% point reduction in the corporate tax rate, reducing the
current top rate from 35% to 34.8%, for example. A surtax on executive pay could
fund a meaningful and salient reduction in the taxation of investment returns but only
a very modest reduction in the general corporate income tax that one might fear would
be lost in the rounding.
Of course, a firm-specific corporate income tax credit tied to the surtax would not
be hampered by the mis-match in magnitude between excess executive pay and
corporate income. Even without reverting to firm-specific relief, this difference in
scale could be addressed by explicitly tying the general corporate income tax relief in
any year to the amount of surtax collected in the prior year. In this way, the general
corporate tax relief would not be lost in negotiations over the rate.
In sum, from a salience and persistence perspective, general dividend relief is
probably superior to general corporate tax relief. However, it is possible to mitigate
the corporate tax relief disadvantage through creative design.
4. Other Issues
Several other issues might be considered in designing investor tax relief to mitigate
the adverse effect of excessive executive pay.
•

Although the effect might be modest, dividend tax relief would encourage
investment in dividend paying firms, larger payouts at dividend paying firms,
and dividend payouts at more companies, at the margin. To this extent, both
taxable and tax exempt investors might benefit as healthy dividend payouts
may provide corporate governance benefits. 172
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See supra note X.
STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME 2008
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 42 tbl.1.4 (2008). $141 billion of aggregate qualified dividends
were reported on 21 million taxable returns. Total aggregate qualified dividends of $159 billion were
reported on 26 million taxable and non-taxable returns.
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STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME 2008
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 fig. A (2008) (estimating aggregate corporate income subject to
tax of $1.25 trillion for 2007 and $0.98 trillion for 2008).
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Amy Dittmar & Jan Mahrt-Smith, Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings, 83 J. FIN.
ECON. 599 (2007) (finding the market significantly discounts the value of cash-on-hand in poorly
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•

Firm-specific relief might be viewed as suggesting a level of precision in
assessment of excessive compensation that executive pay critics would not
claim. It is impossible to determine how much executive pay is excessive at
any given company and should be refunded to that company’s investors. It is
unlikely, of course, that any board would acknowledge that a portion of
executive pay is excessive and that any surtax should be applied.

•

General investor tax relief, taking the form of a reduction in corporate tax rates
or dividends, generally, seems more in keeping with the idea that executive pay
is systematically higher across firms because managers with power over their
own pay at a significant number of companies drive up the entire executive pay
market. As a result, investors in the corporate sector, non-corporate capital,
and labor bear this cost, irrespective of the quality of corporate governance at
any particular company. Arguably, then, tax relief should be directed at
corporate sector investors generally.

•

Providing general investor tax relief would be less administratively
burdensome and less expensive than providing firm-specific relief, and the
relatively modest sums at stake tend to make a low cost approach more
desirable.

In sum, investor tax relief could take one of several forms. There are pros and
cons to general and firm-specific approaches and to approaches that are based on
corporate income and dividends. In my view, corporate income seems the more
promising basis for investor tax relief and the case for general versus firm-specific
corporate income tax relief seems about balanced. Ultimately, political considerations
would likely play as important a role as economic considerations in designing investor
tax relief.

V. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES

governed firms); Jarrad Harford et al., Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings in the US, 87 J.
FIN. ECON. 535 (2008) (finding firms with weaker governance more likely to repurchase shares than
issue dividends in order to avoid future payout commitments); Pornsit Jiraporn, et al., Dividend Payouts
and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation, 46 FIN. REV. 251 (2011) (finding firms
with strong governance have a higher propensity to pay dividends). But see Wayne H. Mikkelson & M.
Megan Partch, Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Hinder Performance, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 275 (2003) (finding that the holding of large cash reserves promotes investment without
hindering performance); Micah S. Officer, Dividend Policy, Dividend Initiations, and Governance (Oct.
5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/docs/officer.pdf)
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This Part considers several alternative means of regulating executive compensation
including direct, coercive regulation, enhanced disclosure, and a different form of tax
incentive. This Part concludes that the two pronged tax approach that has been the
focus of this Article is superior to coercive regulation, which might be more effective
in limiting pay but could be highly inefficient, and to disclosure-based reforms or
expansion of I.R.C. § 162(m), which are unlikely to be effective without being
counterproductive.
A. Coercive Regulation
Some commentators troubled by perceived excesses in executive compensation
have proposed placing limits on executive pay that would be backed by coercive
sanctions. A “hard” cap would be the most effective way to limit executive pay, but
caps would also create significant distortions. Even if executive pay levels are too
high systematically, we do not know the exact degree of excess pay and there is likely
to be substantial heterogeneity in the amount of excess pay from firm to firm. Thus,
coercive regulation is likely to be highly inefficient relative to tax-based regulation.
1. What Coercive Regulation Might Look Like
In general terms, caps on executive pay could be designed as fixed limitations or
caps could be based on a formula, such as a multiple of median employee pay or
company revenues. The Obama administration proposed to limit the non-incentive
compensation of TARP covered executives to $500,000 per year, 173 but I am not
aware of any serious proposal to place a fixed dollar limit on total executive
compensation. 174 The most empirically robust determinant of executive pay is firm
size, 175 and given the huge differences in public company size and scope of
managerial responsibility, it is readily apparent that a one-size-fits-all fixed limitation
on total executive pay would not be a sensible regulatory option.
A formula-based limitation on executive pay would be more plausible. Outraged
by the growing disparity between CEO pay and average worker pay, a number of
commentators and legislators have proposed to limit CEO pay to a multiple of some
measure of employee pay. 176 However, these proposals still do not get at the scale
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See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive
Comp. (Feb. 4, 2009).
174
The Obama administration proposal can be viewed as being analogous to I.R.C. § 162(m), which
was designed to encourage the use of performance-based pay, rather than as an attempt to limit overall
compensation.
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See supra note X and accompanying text [cross reference to Murphy (1999) on same point].
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For example, Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced legislation in 2009 that would have required a
60 percent shareholder vote to authorize executive compensation in excess of 100 times average
employee compensation. See S. 1006, 111th Cong. (2009). For many years, Rep. Martin Sabo (D-MN)
introduced legislation that would have limited the deduction for employee compensation to an amount
equal to 25 times the pay of the lowest paid employee. Sabo has retired, but his legislation continues to
be introduced in the House. See, H.R. 382, 112th Cong. (2011).
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problem. Under a scheme such as this, the CEO of a small tech company populated
with highly skilled and highly compensated engineers could be paid more than the
CEO of a massive company with a large population of relatively low paid workers,
such as Exxon. 177
More plausible still would be a formula tied to some measure of firm size such as
assets, revenue, or market capitalization. 178 It is also possible that a formula would
provide for adjustments based on company performance. 179
Dietl, Duschl, and Lang stress the importance of maintaining performance
incentives within a salary cap system. Absent performance incentives, executives
would be motivated to perform well only by the prospect of losing their (salary
capped) positions. One would also expect that without performance incentives
executives would tend to act in a much more risk averse fashion than their typically
well-diversified shareholders would prefer. 180
Maintaining performance incentives within a “salary cap” system is not
conceptually difficult. The key would be to limit the ex ante value of executive pay,
but to allow and encourage firms to provide performance-based pay. Suppose, for
example, that three companies each issued stock options to their CEOs with ex ante
expected value of $5 million, the limit set by their pay cap formulas. 181 The CEO
whose firm most outperformed market expectations (as incorporated in the firm’s
share price at the time of option grant) would receive the largest ex post payoff.
Once one moves beyond salary, however, limitations on ex ante pay become more
difficult to enforce, and this enforcement concern suggests one advantage of tax-based
regulation over pay caps. The realized value of compensation is relatively easy to
determine with precision (and to tax). The ex ante value of some forms of pay – stock
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options and SARs, in particular – requires calculations which involve manipulable
inputs. 182
A hard cap on executive pay, whether formula based or not, presumably would be
backed by significant sanctions for failure to comply. As it recently did in the case of
several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 183 Congress might direct the SEC to require
the stock exchanges to delist firms that failed to comply with executive pay caps.
Alternatively, Congress could impose such sufficiently severe financial penalties that
it would be virtually impossible for firms to exceed the pay caps.
2. Pros and Cons of Coercive Regulation (Relative to Tax)
A significant advantage to coercive regulation in a context in which executives
exert substantial influence over their own pay is that a hard cap precludes any
possibility of a gross up. As long as all avenues of compensation can be identified and
reasonably valued, 184 a hard cap would effectively limit executive pay and thus would
most effectively address the impact of excessive pay on the distortion of investment
decisions, the growing inequality of wealth, and the distortion in entry into the
executive labor market.
Although a hard cap on executive pay would not be susceptible to being grossed
up through conventional compensation, firms and executives would undoubtedly seek
out ways of transferring value to executives that would not be subject to the cap.
Despite investor sensitivity to executive perks, one would imagine that we would
observe much greater use of corporate supplied housing, cars, and vacations disguised
as business travel if these benefits were not appropriately valued and included in
income subject to the cap. A hard cap would result in much greater pressure on
avoidance of this type than would a surtax that allows compensation above a
threshold, but extracts a portion thereof.
3. The Inefficiency of Coercive Regulation More Generally (Relative to
Tax)
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A hard cap on executive pay (whether a fixed amount or a formula based approach
that would reflect differences in firm size and incorporate performance incentives)
backed by severe financial penalties is an example of what economist Robert Cooter
refers to as a sanction. 185 A surtax on executive pay above a certain threshold is a
price in his terminology. The fundamental difference between the two and the primary
reason that caps are likely to be an inferior approach to regulating executive pay is that
sanctions are more distorting of behavior. As Cooter suggests, most actors comply
with a standard that takes the form of a sanction. If firms that paid executives in
excess of $5 million per year faced certain and severe financial penalties, few would
pay in excess of $5 million per year. Taxes, or more generally, prices allow actors to
optimize over the cost of paying the tax or adjusting their behavior.186 Prices result in
greater freedom of behavior and less distortion.
The problem for coercive regulation is one of information. 187 If a regulator could
easily determine the optimal level of activity or precaution, a sanction might be the
best regulatory response. In such a case, we want to distort behavior. However, in
cases in which the regulator observes market failure but in which it is difficult to
determine the efficient level of activity or precaution that is being regulated, the
distortion created by a sanction can be very inefficient. 188 If we believe executive pay
is excessive, but we do not know the optimal level of pay, a price or tax is likely to be
the superior regulatory response.
It would be extraordinarily difficult for a regulator to determine the optimal level
of executive pay or to produce a formula for determining that level at any particular
firm. As commentators have noted, it is almost impossible for external observers to
evaluate pay levels at particular firms even ex post, 189 which is, perhaps, the primary
reason that the courts have been so hesitant to find that litigated pay levels are
excessive. 190 Coming up with an ex ante formula to limit executive pay across the
board would be even more difficult. There is undoubtedly substantial heterogeneity in
the optimal level of pay at U.S. companies even after controlling for firm size,
industry, etc. To be sure, a tax response to excessive pay also requires a threshold or
thresholds, which could also be formula based. The difference is that, for the reasons
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Cooter described, the cost of getting the threshold wrong is very much lower in the
case of a tax.
A cap on executive pay that had any real teeth would have several pernicious
effects. First, a cap would tend to drive talented individuals out of the sector, leaving
less talented individuals with fewer outside opportunities behind to manage our largest
companies. 191 Second, pay-capped executives who remained would tend to work less
and consume more leisure. 192 This effect might be mitigated by utilizing caps on ex
ante pay that permit the use of performance-based compensation, but as noted above,
enforcement costs would increase in this scenario. Third, pay caps – even
sophisticated performance and size-based caps – would lead to an inefficient allocation
of talent. Dietl, Duschl, and Lang analogize to professional sports. From an
efficiency standpoint, we want the most talented players to play for the teams with
highest marginal returns on talent. 193 These are not necessarily the highest revenue
teams, although there is probably a strong correlation. Fourth, while size- and
performance-based caps seem superior to fixed dollar caps, adopting more
sophisticated caps would have unintended consequences. I have already noted the
potential option value manipulation problem, but caps like these could have more
serious real world effects. For example, if pay caps are based on firm size, executives
would have a greater incentive than today to engage in empire building, even at the
expense of shareholder value. 194 Fifth, the imposition of pay caps with real bite might
cause some U.S. companies and/or U.S. executives to repatriate overseas, if so doing
would allow the executives to avoid the regulation and would result in a superior mix
of compensation, taxes, services, and amenities. 195
191
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These are serious concerns, and it seems likely that if Congress were to adopt
executive pay caps it would set the caps at a fairly high level so as to minimize these
distortions. That result could well be worse than doing nothing. Any cap that is
placed on executive pay – whether formula based or a fixed dollar amount – is likely
to become a target as did the $1 million “cap” imposed by § 162(m). 196 If a cap were
to be enacted at the high range of current pay so as to limit the inefficiency associated
with one-size-fits-all compulsory regulation, the cap would serve as an invitation to
raise pay for executives at the majority of firms, at which existing pay levels would be
below the cap, as well as serving as a constraint on pay for the minority of firms,
where current pay levels would equal or exceed the cap.
To be sure, a surtax on executive pay would also require a threshold that would
serve as a target, and a surtax could also produce pernicious effects. But both
concerns would be much reduced in the case of a surtax. Ideally, most firms would
not adjust compensation following the imposition of a surtax, and the surtax would
simply pull back a portion of the rents that are extracted by executives, but firms
would have latitude to make individualized choices regarding executive pay levels that
would be precluded by a cap. Moreover, because a surtax would be just that – a tax –
rather than a limitation, there would be less risk in adopting a low threshold for the
tax, such as $1 million per year. Few senior executives of the large public companies
in which the pay setting process is suspect earn less than $1 million per year. As a
result, the potential cost of creating a compensation focal point through the imposition
of this surtax should be modest.
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But, one might object, doesn’t the foregoing parade of horribles that I have
associated with pay caps ignore this Article’s premise that the executive labor market
is flawed and that pay levels are systematically inflated today? Well, yes and no.
Clearly, the impact of a pay cap on executive flight from the corporate sector depends
on the amount of rent that is being extracted today. Just as LeBron James is unlikely
to quit playing basketball if his pay is capped at 75% of current earnings, highly
talented corporate executives who extract substantial rents are unlikely to move on as a
result of a cap. On the other hand, the existence of substantial rents is unlikely to
mitigate the enhanced empire building incentive. More fundamentally, the working
premise of this Article does not imply that excessive executive pay is uniform. There
is likely to be substantial heterogeneity, such that any pay cap arrangement that has
teeth would implicate the concerns listed above at a sizeable number of firms.
B. Enhanced Disclosure
Over the last 20 years, the most popular regulatory response to perceived executive
pay problems has been enhanced SEC disclosure requirements. The SEC has labored
hard to ensure that pay disclosure for top corporate executives is comprehensive and
transparent, and they have largely achieved that goal. New rules adopted in 2009
finally provide a comprehensive measure of the total grant date value of executive pay
packages that is both reasonably accurate and comparable from firm to firm. 197
As noted above, enhanced SEC disclosure requirements may have contributed to
upward ratcheting of executive pay, 198 but the general Brandeis-ian idea that sunlight
is the best disinfectant remains sound. 199 The problem in this context is that disclosure
can at best provide discipline with respect to compensation that is excessive on a
relative basis. The innovation of requiring regular shareholder advisory voting on
executive pay practices can potentially sharpen this discipline, 200 but, because it is
very difficult to assess executive pay levels on an absolute basis, disclosure and
shareholder “say on pay” votes are unlikely to have any significant effect on
systematically excessive pay levels that are the focus of this Article.
C. Amend I.R.C. § 162(m)
An alternative tax-based approach to addressing systematically excessive
executive pay would be to amend or replace I.R.C. §162(m) with an overall limitation
on the amount of senior executive pay that is deductible, with no exceptions for

197

David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds.,
Elgar Press, forthcoming 2011).
198
See supra note X and accompanying text.
199
LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
200
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n-1(a) (West
2010).

57

A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem
performance-based pay, or anything else. For several reasons, however, this does not
seem a promising approach.
First, imagine an overall cap on deductible pay of $1 million per executive per year
– the current limitation on non-performance based pay. Our experience with the
current § 162(m) suggests that this sort of tax penalty would likely be ignored with
respect to highly paid executives at the majority of firms. Although most companies
initially reacted to the enactment of § 162(m) by limiting non-performance based pay
to $1 million per executive per year, today firms routinely exceed this limitation,
providing salaries and other non-performance based pay well in excess of the $1
million threshold. 201 In their proxy statements, these firms typically state that
deductibility is only one factor that the board considers in executive pay
deliberations. 202 This is an interesting development, because it is generally considered
to be relatively easy to qualify pay as deductible under § 162(m) by, for example,
providing bonus opportunities with easily achievable targets. 203 In a tax world in
which there were no performance-based exceptions to a $1 million cap on deductible
pay, it seems likely that firms would simply dismiss the limitation as unreasonably
low.
Thus, it is unlikely that the expanded reach of a $1 million limitation on
deductibility would significantly reduce executive pay. It would, however, raise
revenue, reduce shareholder returns, and increase the disincentive to invest in the
corporate sector. To the extent that the expanded deduction limitation did not impact
pay levels, it would be equivalent to an increase in the corporate tax rate.
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Of course, in broadening § 162(m) in the fashion contemplated herein, Congress
might reasonably increase the threshold to reflect current pay practices. As noted
above, median compensation of large firm CEOs was over $9 million for 2010.204
Suppose Congress were to adopt a deductibility limit of $10 million per executive per
year. A deductibility cap of that magnitude might have some effect on curtailing
executive pay. However, a one size fits all limitation of this sort would be inefficient
for the reasons discussed in Part V. In addition, as we saw with the adoption of the
present § 162(m) in 1993, a relatively high threshold might serve more as a target for
the compensation of lower paid executives than as a limitation on pay for the very
highly compensated.

VI. CONCLUSION

Given the risk of gross ups, the superiority of a tax response to the executive pay
problem is not unambiguous. Nonetheless, the combination of a surtax placed on high
levels of executive pay and corporate tax relief seems the most promising means of
reducing executive after-tax incomes and ameliorating the distortions in investment
created by excessive pay without incurring the risks and unintended consequences of
direct, coercive regulation. Let me conclude, however, by suggesting a very different
tack one might take with the data, analyses, and arguments that have been presented in
this Article.
Given the growth in income inequality in this country, particularly at the high end
of the income distribution, and what appears to be a looming fiscal crisis, several
commentators have proposed increasing marginal tax rates for high income individuals
generally. 205 Several commentators have floated the idea of a “millionaires’ tax,” by
which they really mean a surtax on annual incomes in excess of $1 million per year. 206
Taking this broader perspective, one could argue that deficiencies in the executive
labor market resulting in rents for corporate executives represent an additional
justification for levying a general surtax on high income individuals. 207 This
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justification would extend to private company executives and even non-profit
executives to the extent that these labor markets are infected by excess pay received by
public company executives. Of course, this justification would apply only to a subset
of high income individuals. The income of sports stars and entertainers may also
include rents, but there is no reason to think that their compensation does not result
from an efficient labor market. As we have seen, however, the subset of high income
individuals to whom this rationale would apply is larger than we previously believed.
Public and private company executives could account for one-third or more of
individuals in the top 0.1% of the income distribution. 208
More broadly based taxes generally are better (less distorting) than more narrowly
based taxes, 209 and expanding the surtax to all high income individuals would have
several clear advantages over a surtax limited to excessive executive pay. Although
companies could still increase executive pay to offset the effect of a general surtax on
income in excess of $1 million per year, one would think that a general increase in tax
rates would be less likely to be grossed up than a surtax directed specifically at
executive pay. 210 Given a lesser risk of gross ups, there would be less of an imperative
to refund the surtax collected from executives to investors. In other words, if a general
millionaires’ tax were to be imposed, investor tax relief probably would have to stand
on its own bottom.
In addition, expanding the surtax to all high income individuals might mitigate
certain distortions and avoidance maneuvers, such as attempts to defer compensation
to a period in which an individual would no longer be subject to an executive pay
surtax. The imposition of a millionaires’ surtax would also eliminate any difficulty in
identifying the membership of the surtaxed group. 211
Finally, one might think that an advantage to a general millionaires’ tax over an
executive pay surtax would be that the former would do less to distort career decisions.
However, if one accepts the view put forward above that the executive labor market is
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Inequity of Reducing Corporate Rates (Tax Policy Center Working Paper, July 29, 2009) (discussing
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already distorted by the existence of excessive compensation, a modest surtax limited
to executive pay would reduce long-term labor supply distortions rather than create
them. The imposition of a millionaires’ tax instead would simply preserve the existing
distortions in the executive labor market.
To be sure, it is somewhat unfair to compare an executive pay surtax to a general
millionaires’ surtax. The exercise has an apples to oranges quality. Moreover, while
the proposal put forward in this Article addresses the executive pay problem from both
ends, a millionaire’s surtax would do nothing to ameliorate the distortion in capital
allocation that results from excessive executive pay. In my view, these are both
projects worth pursuing. As long as top total marginal federal rates remained in the
vicinity of 50%, I could well imagine doing both.
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